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THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAMPON TAX * 
Bridget J. Crawford ** 
Emily Gold Waldman *** 
ABSTRACT  
Thirty-five states impose a sales tax on menstrual hygiene prod-
ucts, while products like spermicidal condoms and erectile dysfunc-
tion medications are tax-free. This sales tax—commonly called the 
“tampon tax”—represents an expense that girls and women must 
bear on top of the cost of biologically necessary items that they need 
in order to attend school, work, and otherwise participate in public 
life. This article explores the constitutionality of the tampon tax and 
argues that it is an impermissible form of gender discrimination 
under the Equal Protection Clause. First, menstrual hygiene prod-
ucts are a unique proxy for female sex, and therefore any disadvan-
tageous tax classification of these products amounts to a facial clas-
sification on the basis of sex. There is no “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” for taxing menstrual hygiene products, and so the tax 
must fail intermediate scrutiny. Even assuming arguendo that the 
tampon tax is not viewed as a tax on female sex, it is still unconsti-
tutional because it cannot pass rational basis review. 
Since 2016, four states and the District of Columbia have legis-
latively repealed their sales tax on menstrual hygiene products. One 
state, Nevada, did so by ballot referendum in 2018. Other states will 
consider repeal bills in upcoming legislative sessions or may con-
sider ballot initiatives in the future. Women have also brought class 
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action litigation in four jurisdictions, seeking declarations that the 
state tampon tax is unconstitutional and requesting refunds of prior 
taxes paid. The article develops the constitutional arguments that 
can be used by litigators in any ongoing or future case, recognizing 
that menstrual equity activism, including impact litigation, is 
likely to continue in the future. 
Ultimately, what and whom a society seeks to tax signal its larger 
values. The continued imposition of state sales tax on menstrual 
hygiene products, seemingly without a principled distinction from 
other products that are exempted as necessities, exacerbates the ag-
gregate economic inequality that already exists between the sexes. 
The tampon tax is unconstitutional and should be repealed in all 
states. 
INTRODUCTION 
“A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews,” Justice Antonin 
Scalia famously wrote in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health 
Clinic.1 Of course, the reality is more complicated. Although a spe-
cial tax on wearing yarmulkes would be problematic, there is no 
constitutional violation as long as retail sales of yarmulkes are 
taxed like the retail sales of all other clothing.2 Imagine, however, 
that a state sales tax law exempted from taxation some items of 
religious clothing, such as First Communion veils worn by girls 
during a Roman Catholic religious rite,3 or a turban worn by a Sikh 
man as a symbol of commitment to his faith,4 while still imposing 
 
 1. 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993). 
 2. States vary in their sales tax treatment of clothing. In Massachusetts, for example, 
clothing under $175 is exempt from sales tax. See Mass. Dep’t of Revenue, A Guide to Sales 
and Use Tax, MASS.GOV., https://www.mass.gov/guides/sales-and-use-tax [https://perma.cc/ 
8BDX-H7KN] (last visited Dec 1, 2018) (listing tax-exempt items “[f]ood & [m]eals” as well 
as “[a]pparel & [f]abric [g]oods” less than $175). Maryland, in contrast, has an annual “Shop 
Maryland Tax-Free Week,” typically coinciding with the start of a new academic year, when 
“qualifying apparel and footwear $100 or less, per item, are exempt from the state sales 
tax.” Comptroller of Maryland, Shop Maryland Tax-Free Week, MARYLANDTAXES.GOV, https: 
//taxes.marylandtaxes.gov/Individual_Taxes/Individual_Tax_Types/Sales_and_Use_Tax/ 
Tax_Information/Shop_Maryland_Programs/Shop_Maryland_Tax-free_Week/ [https://per 
ma.cc/7XBN-AQEN] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). 
 3. See, e.g., SUSAN RIDGELY BALES, WHEN I WAS A CHILD: CHILDREN’S 
INTERPRETATIONS OF FIRST COMMUNION 25–26, 157–62, 164–66 (2005) (describing the im-
portance of veils worn by girls during the First Communion ceremony). 
 4. See, e.g., ELEANOR NESBITT, SIKHISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 48 (2d ed. 2016) 
(describing the significance of turban for Sikh men); see also Sahar Aziz, Sticks and Stones, 
the Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years After 9/11, 13 CUNY L. REV. 33, 
47 (2009) (describing the mistaken similarities between turbans worn by some Muslims and 
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the tax on yarmulkes. Such taxation clearly would amount to an 
unconstitutional tax on Jews.5 
An analogous situation exists right now with many states’ treat-
ment of menstrual hygiene products. Currently, thirty-five states 
impose a sales tax on tampons, sanitary napkins, and similar prod-
ucts, while simultaneously exempting from taxation numerous 
other items that are deemed necessities rather than luxuries.6 For 
example, Wisconsin exempts spermicidal condoms and erectile 
dysfunction drugs from taxation, but taxes tampons and sanitary 
napkins as luxury items.7 Similarly, California treats various skin 
cleansers, moisturizers, and baby oil as tax-exempt medical “ne-
cessities,” but taxes tampons and sanitary napkins as luxuries.8 
Until a recent change in the law, New York’s broad “medical sup-
plies” sales tax exemption covered products ranging from dandruff 
shampoo to foot powder to bandages—but not tampons and sani-
tary napkins.9 Although this article urges and welcomes legislative 
reforms and ballot initiatives to address these discrepancies, it fo-
cuses on further developing the constitutional argument against 
 
“distinct turban styles of Sikhs,” although members of both groups “have suffered verbal 
harassment and have been denounced as terrorists”); Neha Singh Gohil & Dawinder S. 
Sidhu, The Sikh Turban: Post-911 Challenges to This Article of Faith, 9 RUTGERS J.L. & 
RELIGION, no. 2, 2008, at i, i (“Members of the Sikh faith—the fifth largest religion in the 
world—are required to wear a turban pursuant to religious mandate.”); cf. NESBITT, supra, 
at 48 (describing wearing a turban as not a technical requirement of the Sikh faith). 
 5. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 270. 
 6. See infra Part I.B.  
 7. See WIS. STAT. § 77.54(14) (2011 & Supp. 2017) (exempting from sales tax “drugs”); 
WIS. ADMIN. CODE TAX § 11.09(2)(k) (2018) (defining “drug” for purposes of section 77.54(14) 
of the Wisconsin Statutes to include “medicated condoms”); id. § 11.09(2)(b) (defining 
“drugs” to include “prescription medicines”); see also Jordan Gass-Poore’, Citing Gender 
Bias, State Lawmakers Move to Eliminate ‘Tampon Tax,’  NPR (Mar. 6, 2016, 1:00 PM ET), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/03/06/467377295/citing-gender-bias-state-lawmakers-move-to-
eliminate-tampon-tax [https://perma.cc/2P38-8L3E] (describing effort in Wisconsin to re-
peal the tampon tax). 
 8. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6369(b) (West 2010) (exempting from sales tax “medi-
cines,” the definition of which includes “any substance or preparation intended for use by 
external or internal application to the human body in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease and commonly recognized as a substance or preparation in-
tended for that use”); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18 § 1591(a)(9)(B) (2016) (defining a “medicine” 
as “[a]ny substance or preparation intended for use by external or internal application to 
the human body in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease”). 
Additionally, the code gives as examples of tax-exempt “medicines” baby lotion, oil, and pow-
der, and also medicated skin creams. Id. § 1591(b)(1). 
 9. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1115(a)(3) (McKinney 2017) (exempting from sales tax medical 
equipment and supplies “required for such use or to correct or alleviate physical incapacity, 
and products consumed by humans for the preservation of health but not including cosmet-
ics or toilet articles”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 528.4(b)(3) (2018) (listing Ex-
ample 5 (dandruff shampoo) and Example 8 (foot powder)). 
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existing state sales tax laws. Specifically, we argue that a tax on 
menstrual hygiene products—when roughly analogous male or 
unisex products are exempt on grounds of “necessity”—amounts to 
an unconstitutional tax on women, because menstrual hygiene 
products are so inextricably linked to female biology.10 In other 
words, in the same way that taxing yarmulkes while exempting 
other religious clothing would be treated as a tax on Jews, the ex-
clusion of menstrual hygiene products from the various “medical” 
or seemingly necessity-based sales tax exemptions amounts to a 
tax on women. 
Part I of this article provides an overview of the scope and oper-
ation of sales tax generally and the tax on menstrual hygiene prod-
ucts particularly—i.e., the tax on tampons, sanitary pads, men-
strual cups and similar items (commonly called the “tampon 
tax”).11 In so doing, we also discuss why menstrual hygiene prod-
ucts are indeed medically necessary. And we quantify the particu-
lar burden that the tampon tax—when added to the already signif-
icant expense of menstrual hygiene products themselves—imposes 
on women.12 
 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. Government leaders in Australia recently agreed to eliminate the 10% goods and 
services tax (“GST”) on menstrual hygiene products. See Eli Meixler, Australia Ditches 
“Tampon Tax” After 18 Years of Outrage from Women’s Rights Groups, TIME (Oct. 3, 2018), 
http://time.com/5413585/australia-ends-tampon-tax-gst/ [https://perma.cc/YCH3-L23K]. 
Earlier this year, the Australian Senate passed legislation that would exempt from the GST 
“sanitary products,” defined as “tampons, pads, liners, cups, sponges and other products 
used in connection with menstruation.” Treasury Laws Amendment (Axe the Tampon Tax) 
Bill 2018 (Cth) sch 1 item 2 (Austl.). Some commentators predicted that political opposition 
would prevent the change from occurring legislatively. See, e.g., Louise Yaxley, Senate Vote 
to Scrap ‘Tampon Tax’ Won’t Stop Women Paying 10 Per Cent More for Sanitary Products, 
ABC (June 18, 2018, 12:16 AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-18/tampon-tax-to-
stay-despite-senate-voting-to-remove-it/9879382 [https://perma.cc/YCH3-L23K] (predicting 
that the Australian legislation “is unlikely to pass in the House of Representatives because 
the Coalition Government does not support the change”). Note that not all of those states in 
the United States that exempt menstrual hygiene products from sales taxation adopt a def-
inition that is as capacious as the Australian legislation’s. See, e.g., Mass. Dep’t of Revenue, 
supra note 2 (containing separate lists of “exempt items” and “taxable items”). The Massa-
chusetts statute and the Massachusetts Guide are silent as to the tax treatment of men-
strual sponges and menstrual cups, but by inference, they likely are exempt from sales tax 
as well. See id. 
 12. See infra Part I. We acknowledge at the outset the difficulty of talking about men-
struation without excluding from the discussion transgender individuals and people across 
the gender spectrum who menstruate. See, e.g., Gabriela Armuand et al., Transgender Men’s 
Experiences of Fertility Preservation: A Qualitative Study, 32 HUM. REPROD. 383, 384 (2017) 
(detailing the hormone regimen administered to transgender men who wished to resume 
menstruation in order to become pregnant or to produce eggs for in vitro fertilization); Joan 
C. Chrisler et al., Queer Periods: Attitudes Toward and Experiences with Menstruation in 
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Part II describes the recent antitampon tax movement, which 
started with public awareness and policy campaigns and then 
spread to legislatures, courts and at least one direct appeal to vot-
ers.13 We delve in particular into four class action challenges 
brought in New York, Florida, California, and Ohio.14 The New 
York and Florida cases spurred legislative change and are no 
longer active.15 The California case has been dismissed.16 The Ohio 
case is temporarily inactive, pending an administrative appeal.17 
In neither California nor Ohio has the litigation inspired successful 
repeal of the tampon tax.18 Most recently, in January 2018, after 
dismissing the case on procedural grounds, the Superior Court of 
California rejected (in dicta) the argument that the tampon tax vi-
olates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution or its state counterpart.19 
Parts III and IV provide an in-depth analysis of why the tampon 
tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. Among other things, this 
article might serve as a road map for litigators attempting to chal-
lenge the tax as unconstitutional. Although particular application 
of the argument will vary slightly by state (since each state sales 
tax system has its own definitions and classifications), the under-
lying themes are broadly applicable and can be adapted as needed. 
Part III describes the relevant background to equal protection 
jurisprudence, with particular attention to the question of what 
qualifies as unconstitutional sex discrimination. We discuss how 
the analysis differs depending on whether the law makes a facial 
 
the Masculine of Centre and Transgender Community, 18 CULTURE, HEALTH & SEXUALITY 
1238, 1239 (2016) (reporting that literature search resulted in zero scholarly articles con-
cerning menstruation by transgender men). We have attempted to include multiple perspec-
tives in our analysis. Although linguistically we have not managed to capture the full range 
of the human experience with gender at each mention of “women” and menstruation, anyone 
who has menstruated, does menstruate, or will begin or resume menstruation is impacted 
by our analysis of the constitutionality of the tax on menstrual hygiene products. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.B–E. 
 15. See infra Part II.B, C. 
 16. See infra Part II.D. 
 17. See infra Part II.E. 
 18. See infra Part II.D–E.  
 19. See infra Part II.D. 
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sex classification or is facially neutral, since both of those frame-
works are relevant to the tampon tax.20 In so doing, we review sig-
nificant Supreme Court decisions including Geduldig v. Aiello 
(holding that the denial of insurance benefits for pregnant workers 
was facially neutral, rather than a facial sex-based classifica-
tion),21 Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (up-
holding a state law hiring preference for veterans, even though 
men were more likely than women to be veterans),22 and United 
States v. Virginia (declaring the male-only admissions policy at the 
Virginia Military Institute to be impermissible sex discrimination 
because of the organization’s failure to show an “exceedingly per-
suasive justification” for excluding women).23 
Part IV then advances the argument that the tampon tax is a 
form of impermissible gender discrimination under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Because menstrual hygiene products are so closely 
tied to female reproductive anatomy, their comparatively unfavor-
able tax treatment—in comparison with other roughly analogous 
unisex and male items that receive tax exemptions as necessities—
amounts to a tax on women. Indeed, the principal equal protection 
argument is that menstrual hygiene products are essentially a 
proxy for female sex; therefore, the disadvantageous tax classifica-
tion of these items amounts to a facial classification on the basis of 
sex.24 We thoroughly analyze why Geduldig need not—and indeed, 
should not—be read as foreclosing this argument. We reach the 
same conclusion under a facial neutrality/disparate impact analy-
sis, because the tampon tax has a disparate impact on women and 
likely is connected to indifference toward (or squeamishness about) 
the female biological process of menstruation.25 After all, shifting 
menstrual hygiene products like tampons and sanitary napkins to 
the list of tax-exempt necessities requires explicitly analyzing and 
listing these products, while avoiding the issue leaves them in the 
default “taxable” category.26 Furthermore, because the tampon tax 
should be analyzed as a sex-based classification, it should trigger 
intermediate scrutiny, which it cannot pass. There is no “exceed-
ingly persuasive justification” for excluding menstrual hygiene 
 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974). 
 22. 442 U.S. 256, 269, 271, 281 (1979).  
 23. 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996). 
 24. See infra Part IV.A. 
 25. See infra Part IV.B. 
 26. See infra Part I.B. 
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products from the favorable tax exemptions afforded to other ne-
cessities.27 
Even assuming arguendo that the tampon tax is not viewed as a 
tax on women for purposes of triggering intermediate scrutiny, 
Part V develops the argument that the tampon tax is nevertheless 
unconstitutional because it cannot pass rational basis review. The 
exclusion of menstrual hygiene products from any list of “necessi-
ties” genuinely is irrational, given the clear evidence that they are 
literally necessary for women to leave their homes, go to school or 
work, and otherwise participate in society. Although a broad sales 
tax base is desirable in order to generate the greatest amount of 
revenue for the state, the negative expressive impact of the tampon 
tax is far greater than any revenue these products could gener-
ate.28 
The article concludes by positioning tampon tax repeal efforts in 
the context of larger efforts to eliminate discrimination. Ulti-
mately, it is unfair to tax women on products that are necessary 
for them to fully participate in society, while simultaneously ex-
empting other items that are no more (and often less) necessary. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF THE TAMPON TAX 
A. The Workings of State Sales Tax 
The state sales tax is familiar to most people.29 For many, pay-
ment of the sales tax is a weekly or even daily occurrence.30 In 
 
 27. See infra Part IV.C. 
 28. See infra Part V. 
 29. See, e.g., Jerome R. Hellerstein, Significant Sales and Use Tax Developments Dur-
ing the Past Half Century, 39 VAND. L. REV. 961, 963 (1986) (describing development of state 
sales tax during the period of 1932 to 1984). 
 30. See, e.g., Scott R. Baker et al., Shopping for Lower Sales Tax Rates tbl. 2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23665, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol 
3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2893738 [https://perma.cc/4M46-9X5C] (showing in a multiple-
year study of over 150,000 households the frequency of purchases of taxable and nontaxable 
items is a rate of 0.041 times per month to 5.571 purchases per month). For a related study 
of United Kingdom consumers, see Rachel Griffith et al., Consumer Shopping Behavior: How 
Much Do Consumers Save?, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 102 (2009), finding in a survey of over 
23,000 households in the United Kingdom for the calendar year 2006 the average household 
acquired food and beverages every four days.  
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forty-five states (all but Alaska, New Hampshire, Oregon, Dela-
ware, and Montana) and the District of Columbia,31 any time a con-
sumer walks into a corner store and buys tangible property like a 
newspaper or a pencil, the retailer must collect a sales tax equal to 
a percentage of the property that is sold.32 The consumer pays the 
tax at the register and typically has no further interaction with the 
sales tax system.33 
Mechanically, the state imposes on the seller the obligation to 
collect the sales tax and then remit it to the state.34 The amount of 
the sales tax is determined by reference to the retail price of the 
property sold.35 State sales tax percentages range from approxi-
mately 2.9% to 7.25%.36 Because local governments may impose 
 
 31. Alex Raut, States Without Income Tax Rely on Varying Forms of Revenue, TAX 
FOUND. (Apr. 26, 2012), https://taxfoundation.org/states-without-income-taxes-rely-varying 
-forms-revenue [https://perma.cc/QJ6P-V4R8] (listing Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New 
Hampshire, and Oregon as states without sales tax). This has been true since at least 1984. 
Compare Hellerstein, supra note 29, at 936 (“At the end of 1984, in contrast to the single 
state that levied a general sales tax in 1932, the tax was in full force in forty-five states and 
the District of Columbia—every state except Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, 
and Oregon”), with Taryn Hillin, These Are the U.S. States That Tax Women for Having 
Periods, SPLINTER (June 3, 2015, 12:33 PM), https://splinternews.com/these-are-the-u-s-stat 
es-that-tax-women-for-having-per-1793848102 [https://perma.cc/7F43-9L68] (listing 
Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon as those that do not have a sales 
tax). 
 32. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. ROSEN & WALTER NAGEL, 1300 TAX MGMT. SALES & USE TAX 
PORFOLIOS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 1300:01.B (describing the imposition, calculation, collec-
tion of states’ sales taxes). For one state’s public educational materials regarding the sales 
tax, see Student Tax Educations Program—Teens and Taxes: Everyday Purchases, OHIO 
DEP’T TAX’N, https://www.tax.ohio.gov/taxeducation/everyday_purchases.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/D3V3-RFZ6] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).  
 33. The sales tax is different from a use tax insofar as applicable state laws typically 
impose a sales tax on the retail purchase of goods within the state, whereas a use tax is 
“levied upon the use, storage, or consumption of tangible personal property within the state 
if such property had not already been subject to the state’s sales tax.” 1 RICHARD D. POMP 
& OLIVER OLDMAN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 6–39 (8th ed. 2015). For an overview of the 
relationship between sales tax and use tax in the context of the recent decision by the Su-
preme Court in South Dakota v. Wayfair, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018), see Adam 
Thimmesch, More Post-Wayfair Thoughts: Sales Tax?, SURLY SUBGROUP (June 26, 2018), 
https://surlysubgroup.com/2018/06/26/more-post-wayfair-thoughts-sales-tax/ [https://perma 
.cc/6P7U-PFNX], focusing on South Dakota’s requirement that out-of-state sellers collect 
sales tax and not use tax given sales in excess of an aggregate dollar amount or number of 
sales, and critiquing the Court for having “unsettled some even longer-standing doctrine in 
this area,” in part by collapsing the distinction between the sales tax and use tax. 
 34. See, e.g., 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 2213 (“Generally, the responsibility for the collection 
of a sales tax is on the seller.”); ROSEN & NAGEL, supra note 32, § 1300.01.B. 
 35. ROSEN & NAGEL, supra note 32, § 1300.01.B. 
 36. See, e.g., JARED WALCZAK & SCOTT DRENKARD, TAX FOUND., STATE AND LOCAL 
SALES TAX RATES 3 (2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180313143458/Tax-Founda 
tion-FF572.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLY8-NXZN] (reporting that out of all states that have a 
sales tax system, Colorado has the lowest rate at 2.9% and California has the highest rate 
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their own sales tax on top of the state sales tax, the combined ag-
gregate state and local sales tax rates range from 4.35% (Hawaii) 
to 10% (Louisiana).37 Nationwide, state sales tax generates more 
revenue than state income tax does.38 Indeed, many state budgets 
are funded in greatest part by the sales tax.39 
In comparison to the sales tax system, state and federal income 
tax regulations require individual taxpayers to file long and com-
plex forms at least once a year, if not more frequently.40 To many 
 
at 7.25%). 
 37. See, e.g., id. at 2–3 (reporting that out of all states that have a sales tax system, 
Hawaii has the lowest combined state and local rate at 4.35% and Louisiana has the highest 
rate at 10.02%).  
 38. See, e.g., 2016 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econ/stc/2016-annual.html [https://per 
ma.cc/8CW8-QMLY] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (reporting 2016 state sales and gross receipts 
tax collections of more than $441 billion, but just over $391 billion in state income tax col-
lections). 
 39. Id. In the five states that do not have a sales tax, other taxes serve as the main 
source of revenue. Alaska, for example, collects a large percentage of its revenue from taxes 
imposed on natural resources extraction. See, e.g., id. (reporting Alaska’s 2016 state tax 
collection by category); see also Raut, supra note 31. Delaware relies on personal income 
taxes, corporate franchise taxes, and a gross receipts tax, sometimes called the “hidden sales 
tax,” imposed on the seller of goods and services in the state. Jonathan Starkey, Delaware 
Taxes: Top 5 Sources of State Revenue, DEL. ONLINE: FIRST ST. POL. (May 19, 2014, 11:52 
AM ET), https://www.delawareonline.com/story/firststatepolitics/2014/05/19/delawaretax 
es/9279693 [https://perma.cc/365S-S3KK]. A gross receipts tax is a tax on a company’s gross 
revenues, without regard to source. Del. Div. of Revenue, Gross Receipts Tax Frequently 
Asked Questions, DELAWARE.GOV, https://revenue.delaware.gov/frequently-asked-questions 
/gross-receipts-tax-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/K8N3-WJTF] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). The Del-
aware rates range from 0.1006% to 0.7543%, based on the type of business. Id. The law 
makes available an exclusion of the first $100,000 to $1,250,000 in gross monthly revenue, 
again based on the type of business. Id. States may rely on revenue from forfeiture of aban-
doned property or state-run casinos and lotteries, as well. See Starkey, supra.  
 40. In response to calls for simplification of the federal income tax reporting require-
ments, the Treasury Department issued a much-anticipated “post-card” form, meant to be 
smaller and more straightforward than the existing form. See, e.g., Lis Moyer, Treasury, 
IRS Reveal a Postcard-Size Form to File Your Taxes, CNBC (June 29, 2018, 3:30 PM), https: 
//www.cnbc.com/2018/06/29/treasury-irs-announce-postcard-size-form-1040-for-next-year. 
html [https://perma.cc/CT3B-XWBP] (showing an image of the “postcard” return). Compare 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1040, U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-dft/f1040--dft.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXK2-ERB7] (draft of post-
card-size U.S. Individual Income Tax Return) with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1040, 
U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K88Y-AZWW] (two-page U.S. Individual Income Tax Return). A shift to 
filing by “postcard” is not considered salutary by most tax professionals and has been the 
subject of some criticism. See, e.g., Francine Lipman (@Narfnampil), TWITTER (June 26, 
2018, 1:05 PM), https://twitter.com/Narfnampil/status/1011702014353465344 [https://per 
ma.cc/7CLF-M4CC] (calling the postcard tax return “a terrible application of form over sub-
stance”); Harry Stein (@HarrySteinDC), TWITTER (June 26, 2018, 6:37 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/HarrySteinDC/status/1011604405437845505 [https://perma.cc/XU6U-6QKC] (“I’ve 
been a tax preparer for 7 years. This new ‘postcard’ tax form is more than silly. People are 
going to screw up their taxes because of it . . . .”).  
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people, the income tax system seems arcane, inscrutable, and per-
haps even unfair, as there is a not unfounded assumption that 
well-advised individuals use sophisticated techniques to minimize 
taxes in ways that the average taxpayer does not understand.41 
But the sales tax is salient, simple, and largely unavoidable.42 It is 
a lens through which one easily can identify inequality.43 
The sales tax is considered a regressive tax, in that it is not cal-
ibrated to ability to pay.44 The degree of a sales tax system’s re-
gressivity depends in large part on what items are exempt from the 
sales tax. And indeed, almost every state classifies at least some 
items of tangible property as tax-exempt.45 States tend to describe 
tax-exempt items in broad categories, such as medicines or grocer-
ies.46 Generally speaking, items that tend to be exempt from state 
 
 41. See, e.g., Karyl A. Kinsey et al., Framing Justice: Taxpayer Evaluations of Personal 
Tax Burdens, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 845, 867 (1991) (“[T]ax policies that allow people to lower 
taxes legally serve in the aggregate to increase the perceived unfairness of the tax system. 
These policies generate perceptions of unfairness among taxpayers who do not qualify for 
the tax benefits they provide, without any offsetting reductions in perceived unfairness 
among those who do qualify.”). Students studying tax laws frequently express such senti-
ments, as well. See, e.g., ROBERT W. MCGEE & GALINA G. PREOBRAGENSKAYA, ACCOUNTING 
AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE AND ASIA 315, 317 (2006) (reporting 
results of survey of 134 Romanian students suggesting that the predominant view is that 
tax evasion is morally acceptable when the tax system itself is unfair).  
 42. See, e.g., Mark J. Cowan, Nonprofits and the Sales and Use Tax, 9 FLA. TAX. REV. 
1077, 1105 (2010) (discussing the ease of administration of collection of sales tax from retail 
consumers); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Sali-
ence and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 24 (2011) (“Tax salience is important because 
of the common intuition, confirmed by some evidence, that taxpayers consistently perceive 
themselves as paying less (or more) in taxes in response to certain forms of tax presenta-
tion.”); Hayes R. Holderness, The Unexpected Role of Salience in State Competition for Busi-
nesses, U. CHI. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2017) (discussing the difference between “undersalient” 
and “hypersalient” taxes on consumer behavior); Jacob Goldin, Note, Sales Tax Not In-
cluded: Designing Commodity Taxes for Inattentive Consumers, 122 YALE L.J. 258, 263 
(2012). 
 43. See Bridget J. Crawford & Carla Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Hu-
man Rights, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 491, 546 (2017) (“It does not require any special training in 
law or economics to understand that taxes on menstrual products mean less money left in 
the female consumer’s pocket.”). 
 44. See, e.g., MABEL L. WALKER, WHERE THE SALES TAX FALLS 1 (1934) (calling the sales 
tax an “upside down income tax” based on “inability to resist rather than ability to pay”); 
Joseph R. Santoro & Caleb S. Fuller, Note, Reassessing the Fair Tax, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 
385, 393 n.57 (2016) (explaining that “the poor, on average, spend a higher percentage of 
their income on consumer goods”); see also JOHN F. DUE, SALES TAXATION 39–40 (1957) (de-
scribing sales tax as striking more heavily the persons least able to pay). The critique of the 
regressivity of the sales tax is as old as the sales tax itself.  
 45. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 42, at 1106. 
 46. See ROSEN & NAGEL, supra note 32, § 1300.05.D (describing “Special Types of Tan-
gible Personal Property”). 
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sales tax are those that are “necessities” of basic living.47 But odd 
discrepancies appear in what counts as a “necessity,” with thirty-
five states subjecting menstrual hygiene products to sales tax, 
while simultaneously exempting products that are no more—and 
often less—necessary by any estimation, as described in the next 
section. Because of the clear burden that this differential sales tax 
treatment imposes on women, it merits closer examination. 
B.  The State Tax Treatment of Menstrual Hygiene Products 
There are fifteen states that do not impose sales tax on men-
strual hygiene products, as of November 2018. Five of them are 
states that have no sales tax at all.48 Five more—Maryland,49 Mas-
sachusetts,50 Minnesota,51 New Jersey,52 and Pennsylvania53—
specifically exempt menstrual hygiene products from taxation, and 
have done so since before 2016, when other states began to respond 
to rising public sentiment against the tampon tax.54 These latter 
five states that specifically exempt menstrual hygiene products 
from sales tax accomplish the result in different ways. 
For example, Maryland has a sales tax exemption for the sale of 
“medicine” and “disposable medical supplies.”55 Rather than bring-
ing menstrual hygiene products within the definition of “medical 
 
 47. Crawford & Spivack, supra note 43, at 496–97; see also ROSEN & NAGEL, supra note 
32, § 1300.05.D. 
 48. See Raut, supra note 31. 
 49. MD. CODE ANN., TAX—GEN. § 11-211(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2016 & Supp. 2018).  
 50. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64H, § 6(l) (2017), amended by 2018 Mass. Acts ch. 90, § 4 
(listing medicine and specifically medically related products that are not subject to sales 
tax). 
 51. MINN. STAT. § 297A.67(17) (2017) (exempting from sales tax “[s]anitary napkins, 
tampons, or similar items used for feminine hygiene”). 
 52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-8.1(a)(5) (West 2017) (listing “tampons or like products” 
as exempt from sales tax under general statutory heading “Exemption; medical”). 
 53. PA. CONS. STAT. § 7204(4) (2015 & Supp. 2018) (exempting from sales tax “sanitary 
napkins, tampons or similar items used for feminine hygiene”). 
 54. See infra Part II.A. 
 55. MD. CODE ANN., TAX—GEN. § 11-211(a)(2)–(3) (LexisNexis 2016 & Supp. 2018). Ac-
cording to the Comptroller of Maryland, “medicine” means “a preparation or substance in-
tended to cure, mitigate, treat or prevent illnesses. Medicine includes prescription and non-
prescription drugs, patent medicines, and oxygen sold for medical purposes.” Comptroller of 
Md., Spotlight on Maryland Taxes, MARYLANDTAXES.GOV, http://taxes.marylandtaxes.gov/ 
Business_Taxes/Business_Tax_Types/Sales_and_Use_Tax/Tax_Information/Special_Situa 
tions/Medicine_and_Medical_Equipment.shtml [https://perma.cc/WKQ7-CCZG] (last vis-
ited Dec. 1, 2018). 
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supplies,” however, the Maryland statute then has a separate ex-
emption for “sanitary pads, tampons, menstrual sponges, men-
strual cups, or other similar feminine hygiene products,” without 
regard to the definition of medicine or medical supplies.56 
Massachusetts is somewhat different, in that the Massachusetts 
sales tax exemption applies to “sales of medicine” and specifically 
delineated items including artificial limbs, eyeglasses when pre-
scribed by a doctor, oxygen masks, and baby oil.57 Nowhere does 
the statute mention a tax exemption for menstrual hygiene prod-
ucts.58 Only by consulting the official Massachusetts Department 
of Revenue Guide to Sales and Use Tax does one learn that tax-
exempt “health care items” include not only the items listed in the 
statute but also “sanitary napkins and belts” and “tampons.”59 Be-
cause the list of products in the statute and the guide are so simi-
lar, it may be that Massachusetts legislators were squeamish 
about listing menstrual hygiene products in the statute itself.60 
Finally, the District of Columbia61 and four states—Connecti-
cut,62 Florida,63 Illinois,64 and New York65—repealed their tampon 
 
 56. MD. CODE. ANN., TAX—GEN. § 11-211(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2016 & Supp. 2018). Prior 
to the enactment of Maryland Senate Bill No. 81, the exemption applied to “sanitary nap-
kins or tampons” only. 2018 Md. Laws 525–26 (effective July 1, 2018).  
 57. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64H, § 6(l) (2011 & Supp. 2018); 2018 Mass. Acts ch. 90, § 4  
(effective May 21, 2018) (listing medicine and specifically medically related products that 
are not subject to sales tax); see, e.g., Mass. Dep’t of Revenue. 
 58. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64H, § 6(l) (2011 & Cum. 2018); 2018 Mass. Acts ch. 90 § 
4 (effective May 21, 2018). 
 59. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue, supra note 2.  
 60. See id. 
 61. D.C. CODE § 47-2005(38)(A) (2018) (exempting from sales tax “feminine hygiene 
products” defined as “sanitary napkin[s], sanitary towel[s], tampon[s], menstrual cup[s], or 
sanitary pad[s]”). The District of Columbia City Council legislation that exempted men-
strual hygiene products also created a new exemption for diapers. Id.  
 62. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-412(122) (2018) (exempting from sales tax “feminine hygiene 
products” although the term is not defined further). 
 63. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(nnn) (2018) (exempting from sales tax “products used to absorb 
menstrual flow” defined as “products used to absorb or contain menstrual flow, including, 
but not limited to, tampons, sanitary napkins, pantiliners, and menstrual cups”). 
 64. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/3-5(37) (2016 & Supp. 2017) (exempting from sales tax 
“menstrual pads, tampons, and menstrual cups”). 
 65. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1115(a)(3-a) (McKinney 2017) (exempting from sales tax “[f]eminine 
hygiene products, including, but not limited to, sanitary napkins, tampons and panty lin-
ers”). From a drafting perspective, it is interesting that when the New York legislators re-
pealed the tampon tax in 2016, they did so by adding this section “(3-a).” See id. Section 3 
provides an exemption for drugs and medicines used “in the cure, mitigation, treatment or 
prevention of illnesses or diseases . . . and supplies required for such use or to correct or 
alleviate physical incapacity, and products consumed by humans for the preservation of 
health but not including cosmetics or toilet articles.” Id. § 1115(a)(3). As a drafting matter, 
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tax statutes in 2016 or 2017.66 In 2018, voters repealed Nevada’s 
tampon tax by ballot referendum; the repeal takes effect on Janu-
ary 1, 2019.67 These jurisdictions all created a specific legislative 
exemption from sales tax for menstrual hygiene products.68 Each 
of these jurisdictions now has a sales tax statute that treats men-
strual hygiene products as a stand-alone category of exempt 
goods.69 
  
 
legislators could have simply added the exemption for menstrual hygiene products as a new 
subsection at the end of the list, or even added the exemption for menstrual hygiene prod-
ucts in the same place where it appears, but renumbered the subsections. See id. § 1115(a)(3-
a). Instead, the drafters chose to leave in place subsections (a)(3) (pertaining to drugs and 
medicines) and (a)(4) (relating to prosthetics, hearing aids, eyeglasses and artificial devices 
“to correct or alleviate physical incapacity in human beings,” and sandwich the new exemp-
tion between those existing subsections. Id. § 1115(a)(3)–(4). One possible interpretation of 
this choice is that the drafters wanted to keep the exemption for menstrual hygiene products 
physically clustered near the health-related exemptions and they thought that renumbering 
the subsequent subsections would create more confusion than clarity. For a selection of 
readings from which one might derive a list of best practices in legislative drafting, see, for 
example, Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the In-
side—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons (pt. 2), 66 
STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and 
Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and 
Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685 (2014); Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary 
Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613 
(2014); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legisla-
tive Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807 (2014).  
 66. In 2016, the California legislature passed a repeal bill, but it was vetoed by Gover-
nor Brown. See Liam Dillon, Gov. Brown Vetoes Bill That Would Have Cut Taxes on Tam-
pons and Diapers, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2016, 11:53 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/ 
essential/la-pol-sac-essential-politics-updates-governor-vetoes-bills-to-repeal-sales-147379 
0791-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/S9CH-9832] (reporting Governor Brown’s veto); see 
also infra Part II. 
 67. An Act Relating to Taxes on Retail Sales Tax, S. 415, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 
2017) (providing for a ballot referendum exempting “feminine hygiene products,” defined as 
sanitary napkins or tampons, from state sales tax, which passed and is effective January 1, 
2019); see also Anna North, Nevada Just Got Rid of Its “Tampon Tax,” VOX (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/11/7/18056648/nevada-question-2-tampon-tax-results [https:// 
perma.cc/TCW7-82V5] (reporting that Nevada voters approved repeal of state sales tax of 
6.85% on sanitary pads and napkins). The ballot initiative passed by a 56.48% vote. Ballot 
Questions, Statewide, SILVER ST. ELECTION, http://www.silverstateelection.com/ballot-quest 
ions/ [https://perma.cc/2ZGH-2YAT] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). In Nevada, voter approval is 
required for all amendments or repeal of the Nevada State Sales and Use Tax of 1955, cur-
rently in effect. See, e.g., NEV. SEC’Y OF STATE, PROVISIONS TO BE VOTED UPON IN STATE OF 
NEVADA AT GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 6,  1956, at 13 (1956), https://www.leg.state.nv. 
us/Division/Research/VoteNV/BallotQuestions/1956.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZ9W-34RB] 
(providing for sales and use taxes in Nevada). 
 68. See, e.g., supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (describing Maryland’s separate 
statutory sales tax exemption for menstrual hygiene products). 
 69. See supra notes 61–65 (citing newly enacted legislation in Connecticut, the District 
of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, and New York). 
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As noted above, the typical statutory division between taxable 
and non-taxable items roughly tracks the distinction between “ne-
cessities” and “luxuries.”70 For example, in Minnesota, the sales 
tax exemption applies to groceries like flour, vegetables, poultry, 
and eggs;71 clothing such as t-shirts, rain ponchos, and belts;72 pre-
scription medicines;73 and menstrual hygiene products.74 But Min-
 
 70. This would appear to be the basic approach adopted by Massachusetts where men-
strual hygiene products, food, and articles of clothing below a certain threshold amount are 
not taxed, but more expensive products are. See Mass. Dep’t of Revenue, supra note 2 (listing 
tax-exempt items “[f]ood & [m]eals” as well as “[a]pparel & [f]abric [g]oods” less than $175); 
see also Timothy R. Hurley, Curing the Structural Defect in State Tax Systems: Expanding 
the Tax Base to Include Services, 61 MERCER L. REV. 491, 497 (2010) (explaining that sales 
taxes apply to all tangible personal property unless specifically exempted); CHI., ILL., CODE 
§ 3-40-2 (2018) (exempting tampons and sanitary napkins from Chicago’s Home Rule Mu-
nicipal Retailer’s Occupation Tax, SO2016-705, Mar. 16, 2016; Edward M. Burke & Leslie 
A. Hairston, sponsors) (vote by Chicago City Counsel to treat menstrual hygiene products 
as “medical necessities” and thus exempt from local sales tax, in light of the State of Illinois’ 
previous classification of these products as “medical appliances”). The distinction between 
necessities and luxuries is explicitly incorporated in the European Union’s Value Added 
Tax. See, e.g., Council Directive 2006/112, art. 96–99, 131–63, 2006 O.J. (L 347) (EC) (setting 
four categories—exempt, zero tax, reduced rate, and standard rate—with listed necessities 
such as bread, flour, cheese, milk, and children’s clothing qualifying for no taxation or tax-
ation at a reduced rate of not less than five percent, and luxuries subject to the standard 
rate and taxed at the highest level). The difference between the categories of exempt and 
zero tax is significant insofar as an item in the “zero” category can be moved up to one of the 
higher tax categories (but cannot return to the zero category). See Crawford & Spivack, su-
pra note 43, at 497, 499 (explaining European VAT classifications and tax treatment of 
menstrual hygiene products). 
 71. MINN. STAT. § 297A.67(2) (2017 & Supp. 2018) (exempting from sales tax “food and 
food ingredients,” meaning “substances, whether in liquid, concentrated, solid, frozen, dried, 
or dehydrated form, that are sold for ingestion or chewing by humans and are consumed for 
their taste or nutritional value”); see also MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, FOOD AND FOOD 
INGREDIENTS SALES TAX FACT SHEET 102A (2017), http://www.revenue.state.mn. us/busi-
nesses/sut/factsheets/fs102a.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AS4-9V4D] (giving examples of taxable 
and non-taxable food and food ingredients); Jennifer Dunn, State by State: Are Grocery Items 
Taxable?, TAX JAR: SALES TAX BLOG (Feb. 1, 2018), https://blog.taxjar.com/states-grocery-
items-tax-exempt [https://perma.cc/EL7Z-KJVT] (showing map of states where groceries are 
tax exempt).  
 72. MINN. STAT. § 297A.67(8) (2017 & Supp. 2018) (defining tax-exempt clothing as “hu-
man wearing apparel suitable for general use”); see also MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
CLOTHING SALES TAX FACT SHEET 105 (2009), http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/busi 
nesses/sut/factsheets/fs105.pdf [https://perma.cc/GER9-JJMN] (listing clothing items that 
are and are not subject to state sales tax). 
 73. MINN. STAT § 297A.67(7)(c)(1)(ii)–(iii) (2017 & Supp. 2018) (exempting from sales 
tax “drugs,” meaning any item “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease” or “intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body”); see also MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, DRUGS SALES TAX FACT SHEET 117A (2017), http: 
//www.revenue.state.mn.us/businesses/sut/factsheets/FS117A.pdf [perma.cc/Z52M-ZTKR] 
(giving examples of nontaxable drugs); MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, GROOMING AND HYGIENE 
PRODUCTS SALES TAX FACT SHEET 117F (2017), http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/busi 
nesses/sut/factsheets/FS117F.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DFM-R22X]. 
 74. MINN. STAT § 297A.67(17) (2017 & Supp. 2018) (“Sanitary napkins, tampons, or 
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nesota imposes a sales tax on candied cake decorations, marshmal-
lows, honey roasted nuts, and breath mints;75 fur clothing and hair 
bows;76 and vaginal douches.77 
In the remaining thirty-five states, menstrual hygiene products 
are subject to sales tax—while multiple other products are ex-
empt.78 In addition to exempting various necessities, many of these 
states even exempt clear non-necessities. For example, Arizona 
and Georgia exempt soda and candy from taxation, while imposing 
sales tax on tampons.79 Other unusual exemptions in jurisdictions 
that tax menstrual hygiene products include tattoos and piercings 
(Georgia), chainsaws (Idaho), bibles (Maine), doughnuts (Michi-
gan), coffins (Mississippi), newspaper ink (Nevada), minor league 
baseball souvenirs (New Mexico), garter belts (Vermont), and man-
icures (West Virginia).80 
These unusual exemptions underscore the oddity of simultane-
ously taxing a product that most females must use every month for 
much of their lives in order to leave their homes. There is no debate 
that tampons, sanitary pads, and similar menstrual hygiene prod-
ucts are necessities for women’s health; they absorb the flow of 
menstrual blood. They are also necessary for numerous weeks after 
childbirth to stop and absorb the flow of lochia.81 Women without 
 
similar items used for feminine hygiene are exempt.”). 
 75. MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 71 (listing these items as taxable).  
 76. MINN. STAT § 297A.67(8)(c)(9) (2017 & Supp. 2018) (defining fur clothing by refer-
ence to section 297A.61(46) as “human wearing apparel that is required by the Federal Fur 
Products Labeling Act, United States Code, title 15, section 69, to be labeled as a fur product, 
and the value of the fur components in the product is more than three times the value of the 
next most valuable tangible component”). 
 77. MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 75 (listing as taxable feminine “douches, 
wipes, sprays”). 
 78. See supra notes 48–69 and accompanying text.  
 79. See, e.g., Susie Poppick, More States Tax Tampons than Candy in America, TIME 
(June 3, 2015), http://time.com/money/3907775/states-tax-tampons-candy-america [https: 
//perma.cc/S7DS-8ZQ2] (listing Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Mexico, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming as states where soda and candy are 
tax-free but tampons are not); see also TAX FOUND., FACTS AND FIGURES: HOW DOES YOUR 
STATE COMPARE? (2015), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/Fact&Figures_15_web 
_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB28-2L2C].  
 80. See, e.g., Jennifer Weiss-Wolf, Menstrual Products Are Taxed in 40 States. Here’s 
What You Can Buy Tax-Free, MS.: BLOG (Feb. 19, 2016), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2016/ 
02/19/menstrual-products-are-taxed-in-40-states-heres-what-you-can-buy-tax-free [https:// 
perma.cc/H6TM-J9LK]. 
 81. See, e.g., L.W. Oppenheimer et al., The Duration of Lochia, 93 BRITISH J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 754, 755 (1986) (reporting median duration of lochia of thirty-
three days in study of 236 women); Dan Sherman et al., Characteristics of Normal Lochia, 
16 AM. J. PERINATOLOGY 399, 399 (1999) (“Lochia is usually defined as sloughing of decidual 
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such products must rely on unsanitary rags (which can cause seri-
ous infections), cut up their children’s diapers to create make-shift 
pads, place unwieldy toilet paper or napkins in their underwear, 
or even go without coverage.82 A study by researchers at the Yale 
University School of Medicine found that the use of tampons helps 
to reduce the risk of endometriosis, so tampons may be health-en-
hancing for women.83 In fact, the Food and Drug Administration 
classifies tampons and sanitary pads as medical devices, under-
scoring their objective status as necessities.84 
  
 
tissue and is generally perceived as sequential vaginal discharge.”).  
 82. See, e.g., HOLLY SEIBOLD, TESTIMONY OF BRAWS: BRINGING RESOURCES TO AID 
WOMEN’S SHELTERS, IN SUPPORT OF D.C. B21-0696, THE FEMININE HYGIENE AND DIAPERS 
SALES TAX EXEMPTION AMENDMENT ACT OF 2016, at 3 (2016) (recounting oral reports by 
women at a District of Columbia homeless shelter who resort to “using toilet paper, paper 
towels, or diapers in lieu of sanitary pads or tampons as they are either cheaper or available 
for free”). BRAWS was represented before the District of Columbia Council by Aysha Iqbal, 
Shannon Cooper, and Leslie Benjamin, students in the Legislation Clinic at the University 
of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, under the supervision of Profes-
sor Marcy Karin. See id. at 11; see also Helaina Hovitz, Tampons Are a Necessity, Not a 
Luxury, VICE  (May 24, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://impact.vice.com/en_us/article/j5e9qb/tamp 
ons-are-a-necessity-not-a-luxury [https://perma.cc/D3B9-KNGY] (“Women who cannot af-
ford menstrual products reported that they substitute with whatever they can find: toilet 
paper, paper towels, rags, even dirty socks. Without access to period products, these women 
are at risk for infection, making a lack of access to clean feminine hygiene supplies a health 
issue and a human rights issue.”). 
 83. Erika L. Meaddough et al., Sexual Activity, Orgasm and Tampon Use Are Associated 
with a Decreased Risk for Endometriosis, 53 GYNECOLOGICAL & OBSTETRIC INVESTIGATION 
163 (2002) (reporting results of study of 2012 subjects); see also Use of Tampons and Sexual 
Activity Protect Women Against Endometriosis, YALENEWS (May 29, 2002), https://news.ya 
le.edu/2002/05/29/use-tampons-and-sexual-activity-protect-women-against-endometriosis 
[https://perma.cc/7YCS-TQKP]. 
 84. See 21 C.F.R. § 884.5425 (2018) (sorting into Class II scented or scented-deodorized 
pads made with materials lacking an established safety profile); id. § 884.5435 (sorting into 
Class I various unscented pads); id. § 884.5470 (sorting into Class II unscented tampons); 
see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF—MENSTRUAL 
TAMPONS AND PADS: INFORMATION FOR PREMARKET NOTIFICATION SUBMISSIONS (510(K)S), 
at 13 (2005), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidan 
ce/GuidanceDocuments/ucm071799.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX2Z-8983]  (recommending that 
disclosure of contents of pads and tampons meet the same standards as they apply to med-
ical devices). The significance of a product’s placement into Class I or Class II is that “[m]ost 
Class I devices and a few Class II devices are exempt from the premarket notification 
[510(k)] requirements subject to the limitations on exemptions,” although other require-
ments may apply. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLASS I/II EXEMPTIONS (2018), https://www. 
fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/overview/classifyyourdevice/ucm051 
549.htm [https://perma.cc/G4AQ-HNUT]. “Premarket notifications” are submissions to the 
FDA that demonstrate safety and effectiveness of a particular device. U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., PREMARKET NOTIFICATION 510(K), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregul 
ationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/premarketsubmissions/premarketnotification5 
10k/default.htm [https://perma.cc/BWC4-ALFM].  
CRAWFORDWALDMAN 532 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/2018 1:37 PM 
2019] UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAMPON TAX 455 
The sales tax on menstrual hygiene products matters. Although 
each individual woman differs, one recent study estimated that the 
average woman spends roughly 2280 days (6.25 years) of her life 
menstruating.85 Given variations in rates of consumption and 
price, the average woman might spend between $70486 and $200087 
on tampons and pads alone (excluding any tax) over the course of 
a lifetime.88 A woman might pay from $20 to $145 for state taxes 
 
 85. See, e.g., Jessica Kane, Here’s How Much a Woman’s Period Will Cost Her over a 
Lifetime, HUFFPOST (May 18, 2015, 12:05 PM ET), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/ 
18/period-cost-lifetime_n_7258780.html [https://perma.cc/JC6L-ZGP9] (“[T]he average 
woman endures some 456 total periods over 38 years, or roughly 2,280 days with her pe-
riod—6.25 years of her life.”). Another study suggests that a woman menstruates for an 
average of 2535 days over the course of her lifetime. See Julitta Onabanjo, Celebrating Men-
struation, from Menarche to Menapause, UNFPA (May 24, 2018), https://esaro.unfpa.org/ 
en/news/celebrating-menstruation-menarche-menopause [https://perma.cc/4K35-QVVR]; 
Karen Zraick, It’s Not Just the Tampon Tax: Why Periods Are Political, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/22/health/tampon-tax-periods-menstruation-nyt. 
html [https://perma.cc/5DG2-CX94] (citing statistic that average woman menstruates 2535 
days in a lifetime). 
 86. This calculation assumes an expense of $17.60 per year every year for forty years. 
See, e.g., Gass-Poore’, supra note 7 (citing study by Euromonitor International that the av-
erage American woman spent $17.60 on tampons and pads in 2015). 
 87. Kane, supra note 85 (calculating that in the course of her lifetime, the average 
woman will spend a lifetime average of $1773 on tampons, $443 on panty liners and $4555 
on other items such as pain relievers and replacements for stained clothing). This concords 
with our estimate of a woman’s lifetime expense for tampons and pads of $1732.80, calcu-
lated by assuming 2280 days of menstruation and use of three tampons and one pad per day 
(for a total of 6840 tampons and 2280 pads per lifetime) and a cost of $0.21 per tampon and 
$0.13 per pad. See Tampax Pearl Active Plastic Tampons, Light/Regular Absorbency Multi-
pack, Unscented, 34 Count, 4 Boxes, (Total 136 Count), https://www.amazon.com/Tampax-
Plastic-Absorbency-Multipack-Unscented/dp/B077NL6SPR [https://perma.cc/9Z4G-HL LZ] 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (selling pack of four boxes of thirty-four tampons for $27.88, or 
$0.21 per pad); Stayfree Ultra Thin Regular Pads with Wings For Women, Reliable Protec-
tion and Absorbency of Feminine Moisture, Leaks, https://www.amazon.com/Stayfree-Reli 
able-Protection-Absorbency-Feminine/dp/B00NJNIY1C [https://perma.cc/VR3P-9DKE]  
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (selling pack of thirty-six absorbent pads for $18.89, or $0.13 per 
pad); see also Victoria Hartman, Note, End the Bloody Taxation: Seeing Red on the Uncon-
stitutional Tax on Tampons, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 313, 317 (2017) (“[S]ince nearly every 
woman uses feminine hygiene products during her period, the additional cost imposed by 
state sales tax on feminine hygiene products adds up.”). One estimate is that that every 
British woman will pay an estimated 922 pounds over her lifetime in taxes on menstrual 
hygiene products. Laura Coryton, Periods Come with £18,450 Price Tax. #EndTamponTax 
Already!!, CHANGE.ORG (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.change.org/p/1550755/u/13003696 
[https://perma.cc/B7JL-L2ZT] (showing an online petition urging women to oppose the 
United Kingdom’s Value Added Tax on menstrual hygiene products). This is over $1200. See 
Currency Converter, OANDA, https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/ [https://perma. 
cc/C62C-8TY6] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (using conversion rate of 1.30888 British pounds 
per one United States dollar, the average for the twenty-four-hour period ending Thursday, 
June 28, 2018, 22:00 UTC).  
 88. See, e.g., Gass-Poore’, supra note 7 (laying foundation to estimate the potential life-
time cost of the sales tax on menstrual hygiene products by estimating that the average 
woman will have 450 periods in a lifetime).  
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on top of that, allowing for price variation and state sales tax rates 
that range from 2.9% to 7.25%.89 
Given this ability to quantify the tax’s financial harm, and given 
that male-specific products including spermicidal condoms and 
erectile dysfunction drugs are generally tax-exempt,90 it is not sur-
prising that many people have urged their state legislators to re-
peal the tampon tax as a matter of fairness and equality. Nor is it 
surprising that they have turned to the courts to challenge the 
tampon tax as a violation of equal protection. The next part exam-
ines and analyzes the four class action lawsuits that have been 
filed so far. In each, the framing of the argument is slightly differ-
ent, in order to track the particular state’s language. However, the 
underlying shape and theme of the legal arguments are very simi-
lar. 
II.  CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 
A.  Background 
On January 1, 2015, New York-based attorney and activist Jen-
nifer Weiss-Wolf came home from an inspirational “polar bear 
swim” on Coney Island and stumbled upon a request by some local 
teens collecting tampons and pads for a food pantry.91 Their drive 
spurred her to begin thinking and writing about how menstruation 
impacts actual lives, especially the lives of poor and vulnerable 
women and girls.92 Over the course of 2015, Weiss-Wolf emerged 
as the leading voice in the United States for “menstrual equity,” a 
term she describes as follows: 
In order to have a fully equitable and participatory society, we must 
have laws and policies that ensure menstrual products are safe and 
affordable and available for those who need them. The ability to access 
 
 89. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. This estimate does not take into account 
additional local taxes. It also does not take into account the cost of any menstruation-related 
products or associated sales taxes. Menstruation-related products might include heating 
pads, pain relief medication, or new underwear. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 85 (estimating 
the total lifetime cost of a woman’s period, taking into account all related product needs, as 
$18,171, without specifying whether the estimate builds in state and local taxation). 
 90. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 91. JENNIFER WEISS-WOLF, PERIODS GONE PUBLIC: TAKING A STAND FOR MENSTRUAL 
EQUITY, at x–xi (2017) (describing the origins of her menstrual equity activism). 
 92. Id. at xiv–xvii. 
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these items affects a person’s freedom to work and study, to be 
healthy, and to participate in daily life with basic dignity. And if ac-
cess is compromised, whether by poverty or stigma or lack of education 
and resources, it is in all of our interests to ensure those needs are 
met. Menstrual equity is still an evolving concept and goal.93 
In 2015, the menstrual equity movement gained significant trac-
tion. A massive online petition campaign helped prompt Canada’s 
repeal of its national tax.94 Taking a cue from activists in Canada, 
Weiss-Wolf began a United States-based online petition, cospon-
sored by Cosmopolitan magazine, called No Tax on Tampons: Stop 
Taxing Our Periods! Period.95 In 2015, Kiran Gandhi ran the Lon-
don Marathon while “free bleeding.”96 Thousands of women took to 
social media with the hashtag “#PeriodsAreNotAnInsult” to pro-
test then-candidate Donald Trump’s attempt to discredit reporter 
Megyn Kelly by saying, “[S]he’s not very tough and she’s not very 
sharp. She gets out there and she starts asking me all sorts of ri-
diculous questions, and you could see there was blood coming out 
of her eyes, blood coming out of her . . . wherever.”97 Activists and 
ordinary people around the globe brought so much attention to the 
issue of menstruation that Cosmopolitan called 2015 “The Year the   
 
 93. Id. at xvi. 
 94. Tara Culp-Ressler, After Years of Backlash, Canada Ditches the ‘Tampon Tax,’ 
THINKPROGRESS (May 29, 2015, 3:50 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/after-years-of-backlash 
-canada-ditches-the-tampon-tax-ed5cd867fbf4 [https://perma.cc/5XC2-QWGW] (citing num-
ber of signatories to an Internet petition as a factor leading to tampon tax repeal in Canada).  
 95. See Petition, No Tax on Tampons: Stop Taxing Our Periods! Period., CHANGE.ORG, 
(Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.change.org/p/u-s-state-legislators-stop-taxing-our-periods-per 
iod [https://perma.cc/D38W-DR4G]; see also Bridget Crawford, Interview with Jennifer 
Weiss-Wolf, New York Attorney and Menstrual Equity Advocate, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS 
(Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2016/11/interview-jennifer-weiss-
wolf-new-york-attorney-menstrual-equity-advocate/ [https://perma.cc/6PCA-6CMU]. 
 96. Kiran Gandhi, Sisterhood, Blood and Boobs at the London Marathon 2015, MADAME 
GANDHI (Apr. 26, 2015), https://madamegandhi.blog/2015/04/26/sisterhood-blood-and-bo 
obs-at-the-london-marathon-2015 [https://perma.cc/3VQP-7ZHS] (“I ran with blood drip-
ping down my legs for sisters who don’t have access to tampons and sisters who, despite 
cramping and pain, hide it away and pretend like it doesn’t exist.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Laura Bennett, What Trump Really Meant When He Said That Megyn 
Kelly Had “Blood Coming Out of Her Wherever,” SLATE (Aug. 10, 2015, 7:33 PM), https:// 
www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/10/megyn_kelly_blood_coming_out_of_her_wher 
ever_comment_in_cnn_don_lemon_interview.html [https://perma.cc/K3DY-BPYV]. 
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Period Went Public,”98 and National Public Radio declared it to be 
“The Year of the Period.”99 
Menstrual equity activism continued well into the next two 
years and is ongoing. Many students have begun to demand that 
their colleges and universities provide free menstrual hygiene 
products on campus.100 An Ohio woman began the Free the Tam-
pons Foundation, dedicated to the idea that “every bathroom out-
side the home should provide freely accessible items that people 
 
 98. Anna Maltby, The 8 Greatest Menstrual Moments of 2015, COSMOPOLITAN (Oct. 13, 
2015), https://www.cosmopolitan.com/health-fitness/news/a47609/2015-the-year-the-period 
-went-public/ [https://perma.cc/J9MY-DMJD] (citing Gandhi’s “free-bleeding” run, Canada’s 
repeal of the tampon tax, and Trump’s comments about Megyn Kelly, along with a tennis 
player’s public statement that she was menstruating during the Australian Open tennis 
tournament, Instagram’s censoring of an artistic photograph of a woman with a menstrual 
stain on her pants, a former White House Communications Director’s television statement 
that she bled “every 28 days . . . but the country went on,” Apple’s update to include period 
tracking in its “Health” app, and comedians Key and Peele’s “menstruation orientation” 
routine directed at educating men). 
  99. See Malaka Gharib, Why 2015 Was the Year of the Period, and We Don’t Mean Punc-
tuation, NPR (Dec. 31, 2015, 1:30 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015 
/12/31/460726461/why-2015-was-the-year-of-the-period-and-we-dont-mean-punctuation 
[https://perma.cc/JNA3-YQ74] (“This year has been epic for menstruation, with news and 
social media catapulting the once hush-hush topic into the open.”); see also Hélène Bidard 
(@Helenebidard), TWITTER (Nov. 11, 2015, 8:52 PM), https://twitter.com/Helenebidard/sta 
tus/664485866799108096 [https://perma.cc/9U8M-XM7H] (“Manifestation contra la taxe 
tampon aujourd’hui place du Châtelet #Notaxontampons #Laissezmoisaigner #Culotte-
Gate.” [“Protest against the tampon tax today at Châtelet Place #Notaxontampons #Let-
mebleed #PantyGate.”]); Reina Gattuso, 2015 Was the Year of the Period, and Happy to 
Bleed and Pads Against Sexism Are on It!, FEMINISTING, http://feministing.com/2016/01/ 
05/2015-was-the-year-of-the-period-and-happy-to-bleed-and-pads-against-sexism-are-on-it 
[https://perma.cc/VVY9-VBAB] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (describing work of student activ-
ists at Jamia Millia Islamia University of Delhi, India, who decorated the campus with 
pads); Hayley Gleeson, Tampon Tax: Australian Debate Reignited After France Drops VAT 
on Sanitary Products, ABC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2016, 10:31 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/ 
2015-12-15/tampon-tax-france-reignites-debate-australia/7026836 [https://perma.cc/DK5P-
MG29] (describing protests in Paris where a woman “carried a clothesline swathed with 
blood-stained underwear”).  
 100. See Kimberly Yam, Free Tampons, Pads Now Stocked in Bathrooms Across 
Brown University Campus, HUFFPOST (Sept. 7, 2016, 6:01 PM ET), https://www.huffington 
post.com/entry/bathrooms-across-brown-universitys-campus-are-now-stocked-with-free-
tampons-pads_us_57d03400e4b0a48094a6df9e [https://perma.cc/ED97-AJBD]. Notably, 
however, this was a decision by the Undergraduate Council of Students, not the central 
university administration, to allocate funding to provide menstrual hygiene products. Id.; 
see also Jake New, If Condoms Are Free, Why Aren’t Tampons?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 11, 
2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/03/11/students-demand-free-tampons-ca 
mpus [https://perma.cc/P26A-N4C8] (detailing varying degrees of successful student activ-
ism designed to achieve bathrooms stocked with free menstrual hygiene products at the 
University of Arizona, Columbia University, Emory University, and the University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles); Diamond Naga Siu, Free Menstrual Hygiene Products Come to NYU, 
WASH. SQUARE NEWS (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.nyunews.com/2016/10/24/free-menstrual-
hygiene-products-come-to-nyu [https://perma.cc/5BYW-6CFH] (describing pilot program at 
New York University).   
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who menstruate need for their periods.”101 The Foundation works 
with business owners to provide menstrual hygiene products for 
their employees and guests.102 Perhaps the most publicized local 
success came in June 2016, when New York City Mayor Bill Di-
Blasio signed into law a measure passed by the City Council that 
made available free menstrual hygiene products in all public 
schools, city jails, and city-run homeless shelters.103 
At the state level, in 2016 and 2017, twenty-three states and the 
District of Columbia considered bipartisan legislation to make 
menstrual hygiene products tax-exempt.104 Eight of those states 
considered legislation in both years.105 Legislation in New York, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Florida, and the District of Columbia ulti-
mately was successful; California legislation was vetoed by the 
 
 101. About, FREE TAMPONS, http://www.freethetampons.org/about.html [https://perma. 
cc/2PRC-KZGJ] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (“We think menstruators shouldn’t have to worry 
about an unexpected physical need becoming an overwhelming emotional ordeal . . . . The 
organization is dedicated to providing education and resources that empower advocates to 
create change for women nationwide.”). 
 102. Id. Another focus of menstrual equity activism is access by prisoners to menstrual 
hygiene products. See, e.g., Mattie Quinn, New Federal Tampons Rule Follows States and 
Cities’ Flow, GOVERNING (Aug. 29, 2017), http://www.governing.com/gov-tampons-pads-pri 
sons-states-federal.html [https://perma.cc/E6W8-WBAN]. On August 1, 2017, the United 
States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons issued an “Operations Memoran-
dum” requiring that federal prison wardens provide to inmates at no cost tampons and pads 
in two sizes each, as well as pantiliners. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, No. 
001-2017, PROVISION OF FEMININE HYGIENE PRODUCTS (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.bop.gov/ 
policy/om/001_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XHA-N84Q] (providing guidance applicable for 
one calendar year beginning August 1, 2017, to all federal prisons housing female inmates).  
 103. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Mayor de Blasio Signs Legislation Increasing 
Access to Feminine Hygiene Products for Students, Shelter Residents and Inmates (July 13, 
2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/611-16/mayor-de-blasio-signs-legisla 
tion-increasing-access-feminine-hygiene-products-students [https://perma.cc/AFL7-9US7] 
(including statement by Mayor de Blasio that, “[a]s a father, husband and feminist, I am 
proud to sign these bills into law”). 
104. See e.g., H.R. 2418, 53d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017); H.R. 17-1127, 71st Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017); H.R. 7109, 2017 Leg., 119th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017); S. 
502, 2016 Gen. Assemb., May Spec. Sess. (Conn. 2016); Council, 21-0696, 2016 Leg. Reg. 
Sess. (D.C. 2016).  
105. See Assemb. 9, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); H.R. 4129, 99th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Mich. 2017); H.R. 61, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017); H.R. 5377, 144th 
Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017); H.R. 804, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017); 
H.R. 71, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017); H.D. 1593, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 
2017); Assemb. 683, 2017–2018 Leg., 103d Reg. Sess. (Wisc. 2017); Assemb. 1561, 2015–
2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); H.R. 5234, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016); H.R. 272, 
131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2016); H.R. 7714, 144 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 
2016); H.R. 2059, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2016); H.R. 202, 61st Leg., Gen. 
Sess. (Utah 2016); H.D. 952, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016); Assemb. 949, 2015–
2016 Leg., 102d Reg Sess. (Wisc. 2016). 
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governor.106 In 2018, Nevada voters voted in favor of eliminating 
the sales tax on sanitary napkins and pads.107 In future years, sev-
eral states are expected to consider repeal legislation.108 
B.  New York: 21st Century Class Action 
Prior to 2016, New York was one of the jurisdictions that had 
considered (but never passed) legislation to repeal the sales tax on 
menstrual hygiene products.109 In connection with her increasingly 
national profile, Weiss-Wolf formed the nonprofit policy organiza-
tion Period Equity together with attorney Laura Strausfeld.110 
 
 106. See, e.g., Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of Cal., to Members of the 
Cal. State Assembly (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ 
AB_717_Veto_Message.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PUB-VKRX] (explaining his veto in part be-
cause “tax breaks are the same as new spending -- they both cost the General Fund money. 
As such, they must be considered during budget deliberations so that all spending proposals 
are weighed against each other at the same time.”). The bill would have eliminated the sales 
tax on diapers, as well. See, e.g., Jeremy B. White, Tampon, Diaper Taxes Will Endure in 
California, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 13, 2016, 4:21 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/polit 
ics-government/capitol-alert/article101581562.html [https://perma.cc/C7HN-ASGR]. In 
2017, Governor Brown did sign into law a diaper subsidy for certain low-income families 
with children under the age of three years. See Assemb. 480, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2017); see also California Becomes First State to Subside Diapers After Governor Signs AB 
480, EAST COUNTY TODAY (Oct. 13, 2017), https://eastcountytoday.net/california-becomes-
first-state-to-subsidize-diapers-after-governor-signs-ab-480 [https://perma.cc/56E2-EMN7]. 
 107. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
 108. States that are likely to consider repeal legislation in 2019 include Arizona, Ne-
braska, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Ema Sagner, More States Move to End ‘Tampon Tax’ That’s 
Seen as Discriminating Against Women, NPR (Mar. 25, 2018, 8:01 AM ET), https://www.npr. 
org/2018/03/25/564580736/morestates-move-to-end-tampon-tax-that-s-seen-as-discriminat 
ing-against-women [https://perma.cc/K73F-3F9Z] (including a graphic of states with pend-
ing tampon tax exemption legislation). In 2018, a Utah bill to repeal the tampon tax died in 
committee. See H.B. 262, 62nd Leg. Reg. Sess. (Utah 2018) (proposing removal of sales tax 
on menstrual hygiene products); see also Julia Ritchey (@juliaritchey), TWITTER (Feb. 21, 
2018, 6:03 PM), https://twitter.com/juliaritchey/status/966493594583355392 [https:// 
perma.cc/V2FR-BRT8] (reporting by managing editor of Utah public radio station KUER-
FM that House Bill 262 failed in Utah House Revenue and Taxation Standing Committee 
by vote of three to seven). 
 109. Manhattan Assemblywoman Linda Rosenthal introduced the first repeal legislation 
in 2015. See Abigail Jones, New York Terminates the Tampon Tax, NEWSWEEK (July 21, 
2016, 7:29 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/new-york-tampon-tax-cuomo-periods-tampons-
menstruation-donald-trump-482918 [https://perma.cc/N6KZ-6VJR] (providing a brief over-
view of New York’s tax treatment menstrual hygiene products, which had been subject to 
taxation beginning with the enactment of the state sales tax regime in 1965); see also Linda 
B. Rosenthal (@LindaBRosenthal), TWITTER (July 21, 2016, 11:10 AM), https://twitter. 
com/LindaBRosenthal/status/756189723937439744 [https://perma.cc/SR8W-VMND]  (“My 
bill repealing #tampontax signed into law! We just axed the tax! Good riddance to sexist 
tax.”). For a comparison of New York’s and Utah’s legislative approaches to tampon tax 
repeal in 2016, see Gwenyth S. Gamble Jarvi, Note, Thank Hefner Erectile Dysfunction Is a 
Medical Condition: A Period Piece, 15 PITT. TAX. REV. 181, 187–98 (2018).  
 110. PERIODEQUITY, https://www.periodequity.org/ [https://perma.cc/UQA8-MVT2] (last 
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Strausfeld had been contemplating a legal challenge to the sales 
tax on menstrual hygiene products, as New York legislators had 
considered a repeal bill before, but the bill never made it to a 
vote.111 Period Equity persuaded a New York law firm to represent 
five women in a class action lawsuit.112 
Attorneys filed the complaint in Seibert v. New York State De-
partment of Taxation on March 3, 2016, in a New York state 
court.113 The plaintiffs alleged that the New York state sales tax 
violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and 
New York Constitutions and sought to permanently enjoin the 
state from collecting sales tax on menstrual hygiene products.114 
The plaintiffs also sought restitution of an estimated $14 million 
in sales tax collected in each of the preceding three years, as well 
as attorneys’ fees and costs.115 
The complaint alleged that the New York state sales tax on men-
strual hygiene products was not “substantially related to an im-
portant state interest” or even “rationally related to a legitimate 
state purpose.”116 In other words, the complaint argued that the 
 
visited Dec. 1, 2018) (identifying the organization as “the nation’s first law and policy or-
ganization fighting for menstrual equity—committed to ensuring that menstrual products 
are affordable, safe and available to those in need,” with Jennifer Weiss-Wolf and Laura 
Strausfeld as cofounders). 
 111. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. The New York case was not the first 
legal challenge to the sales tax on menstrual hygiene products in the United States. Over 
twenty-seven years before, three women brought and won a class action in Illinois seeking 
injunctive relief against local and state taxes. See Geary v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 
544 N.E.2d 344, 355–56 (Ill. 1989) (holding that menstrual hygiene products should be clas-
sified as “medical appliances” for applicable tax purposes, and thus were exempt from tax-
ation). For an analysis of the Geary case, see Crawford & Spivack, supra note 43, at 531–
34, and see also Hartman, supra note 87, at 327–29, explaining post-Geary changes to the 
law that led to the restoration of Illinois taxes on menstrual hygiene products in 2009, set-
ting the stage for subsequent legislation in 2016 that affirmatively exempts menstrual hy-
giene products from taxation. 
 112. Bridget Crawford, Interview with Laura Strausfeld, New York Attorney Challenging 
the “Tampon Tax,” FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.feministlawprof 
essors.com/2016/11/interview-laura-strausfeld-new-york-attorney-challenging-tampon-tax/ 
[https://perma.cc/8ZNB-423X] (describing involvement of attorneys at Emery Celli Brinck-
erhoff & Abady LLP). 
 113. Complaint at 1–3, 15, Seibert v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., No. 151800/ 
2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 2016) (seeking an end to the sales tax on menstrual hygiene 
products in New York and requesting tax refunds on behalf of all who had made purchases 
in the state in the prior three years via class action lawsuit). The commencement of the legal 
action immediately attracted press attention. See, e.g., Emma Whitford, NY Women File 
Class Action Lawsuit to End the Tampon Tax, GOTHAMIST (Mar. 3, 2016, 12:53 PM), http:// 
gothamist.com/2016/03/03/tampon_tax_lawsuit.php [https://perma.cc/E3LR-NHKR]. 
 114. Complaint, supra note 113, at 1–2.  
 115. Id. at 9, 15. 
 116. Id. at 13.  
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tampon tax failed intermediate scrutiny, and alternatively, that 
the tampon tax could not satisfy rational-basis review.117 The com-
plaint noted that under the New York State Department of Taxa-
tion and Finance’s approach, products “used to stop the flow of 
blood from nonfeminine parts of the body are ‘medical supplies,’ 
while tampons and pads, used to stop the flow of blood from the 
uterus, are not.”118 It vividly compared New York’s taxation of 
menstrual hygiene products with the state’s failure to tax 
“Rogaine, dandruff shampoo, foot powder, chapstick, and so many 
other less medically necessary products also used by men.”119 How-
ever, the complaint (as is appropriate for an initial pleading) did 
not flesh out the reasoning behind its arguments that the tampon 
tax was discriminatory, other than to say that “a tax on feminine 
hygiene products is on its face a tax on women, and . . . results in 
the disparate treatment of women.”120 
Less than three months after the suit was filed, New York re-
pealed its tax on menstrual hygiene products.121 Instead of reclas-
sifying menstrual hygiene products as “medical products,” New 
York added a stand-alone exemption.122 In part because the plain-
tiffs’ injunctive claims became moot, they agreed to a voluntary 
dismissal of their case.123 When asked why the plaintiffs did not 
pursue their claim for refunds, restitution, attorneys’ fees and 
costs, Strausfeld noted that, “Pursuing a case of this sort, on a con-
tingency fee basis and with an uncertain result, is expensive for 
the attorneys.”124 The plaintiffs did, however, retain the option to 
renew those claims.125 Thus, it seems that the plaintiffs’ primary 
goals were to draw attention to the cause and to effectuate legal 
 
 117. Id. at 8. The plaintiffs parsed the state regulations exempting from taxation “med-
ical supplies,” defined as “supplies used in the cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of 
illnesses or diseases,” and regulations’ examples of medical supplies as “bandages, gauze, 
and dressings.” Id. at 5 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 528.4(g) (2018)). 
 118. Id. at 9 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 528.4(g) (2018)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 13. 
 121. See Associated Press, New York Legislature Cuts Taxes on Tampons and Other Fem-
inine Hygiene Products, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/ 
nyregion/new-york-legislature-cuts-taxes-on-feminine-hygiene-products.html [https://per 
ma.cc/LBC5-5T3F]; Anna North, A Welcome End to New York’s ‘Tampon Tax,’ N.Y. TIMES: 
TAKING NOTE (May 26, 2016, 4:07 PM), https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/a-
welcome-end-to-new-yorks-tampon-tax/ [https://perma.cc/5JPV-Z63A]. 
 122. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1115(a)(3-a) (McKinney 2017). 
 123. See Crawford, supra note 112. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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change, rather than to receive compensation. They were able to 
claim victory once New York repealed its tax.126 
C.  Florida: Legislative Change and Dismissal 
Likely inspired by the result in New York, less than two months 
after the New York legislature voted to repeal the state’s tampon 
tax, a Florida attorney filed a class action in Wendell v. Florida 
Department of Revenue on behalf of a plaintiff who sought to chal-
lenge Florida’s taxation of menstrual hygiene products.127 As in the 
New York suit, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief, a tax refund, 
and a declaration that the Florida statute violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions.128 
And just as the New York plaintiffs had pointed out the oddity of 
New York’s classifications, the plaintiff here focused on the failure 
of Florida to include menstrual hygiene products in the state’s tax-
exempt category of related “common household remedies recom-
mended and generally sold for internal or external use in the cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of illness or disease in human 
beings.”129 The complaint specifically noted that unisex blood ab-
sorption-related products like “band-aids, bandages, gauze, and 
adhesive tape” were tax-exempt under Florida law, as were com-
mon household remedies “also used by men, such as epsom salts, 
athlete’s foot treatment, hair regrowth treatment, and petroleum 
jelly.”130 
 
 126. See, e.g., Annamarya Scaccia, New York Is Finally Pulling the Plug on Its Tampon 
Tax, VICE: BROADLY (Apr. 13, 2016, 11:45 AM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/d7an 
8v/new-york-is-finally-pulling-the-plug-on-its-tampon-tax [https://perma.cc/8S4K-8GYW] 
(quoting New York attorney Zoe Salzman of Emery Celli Brinckerhof & Abady as saying 
that the lawsuit “motivated” the New York state’s legislative repeal). 
 127. Complaint at 2, Wendell v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 2016-CA-001526 (Fla. Leon 
County Ct. 2016). 
 128. Id. at 2, 19. 
 129. Id. at 15 (citing FLA. STAT. § 212.08(2)(a) (2018)). 
 130. Id. at 2 (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12A-1.020(5) (2018)). When asked about 
menstrual hygiene products related to “treatment or prevention of illness or disease in hu-
man beings,” the plaintiff’s attorney explained that the products “play an essential role in 
reducing and preventing the spread of blood borne illnesses,” and that “[s]imply put, it’s a 
public health safety issue, the costs of which are solely borne by women. These products are 
not luxuries—women can’t just stay home until they stop bleeding.” Bridget Crawford, In-
terview with Dana Brooks Cooper, Florida Attorney Challenging the “Tampon Tax,” 
FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (July 28, 2016), https://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2016/07/ 
interview-dana-brooks-cooper-florida-attorney-challenging-tampon-tax-2/ [https://perma.cc 
/2TZ2-STF6]. 
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On May 26, 2017, almost ten months after the filing of the Flor-
ida class action (and one year after New York’s repeal), the Florida 
legislature repealed its tampon tax and Governor Rick Scott signed 
the bill into law.131 In February 2018, the Florida class action was 
dismissed.132 Far from being an obstacle to reform (as one legisla-
tive aide had warned),133 the class action may have spurred the 
state legislature to act. 
Before either New York or Florida repealed its sales tax on men-
strual hygiene products, attorneys filed separate class actions law-
suits in California134 and Ohio.135 The plaintiffs in both cases 
sought declaratory judgments that each state’s respective sales tax 
on menstrual hygiene products was unconstitutional, injunctive 
relief from enforcement, and restitution for taxes previously 
paid.136 Although it does not appear that the attorneys in any of 
the four class action cases consulted each other, it is clear that they 
were aware of the other suits, as the complaints in all four juris-
dictions included substantially similar language.137 
 
 131. H.R. 7109, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017); see also Catherine Pearson, Florida 
Just Became the Latest State to Abolish the ‘Tampon Tax,’ HUFFPOST (May 26, 2017, 11:14 
AM ET), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/florida-just-became-the-latest-state-to-abo 
lish-the-tampon-tax_us_59282d4de4b0df34c35b77cf [https://perma.cc/6RML-AT3H]. 
 132. See Notice of Stipulated Dismissal, Wendell v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, No. 2016-CA-
001526 (Fla. Leon County Ct. 2018); Notice of Dismissal, Wendell v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 
No. 2016-CA-001526 (Fla. Leon County Ct. 2018) (dismissed with prejudice).  
 133. See Jeff Burlew, Sen. Simpson Seeks Repeal of ‘Tampon Tax,’ TALLAHASSEE 
DEMOCRAT (Jul. 13, 2016, 5:13 PM ET), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2016/07/ 
13/sen-simpson-seeks-repeal-tampon-tax/87049694/ [https://perma.cc/54YK-HJVX] (quot-
ing Rachel Perrin Rogers, Republican Senator Simpson’s chief legislative assistant, as say-
ing that Senator Simpson had been previously unaware of the tampon tax and that “[i]n my 
experience as a committee analyst and legislative assistant, there have been many situa-
tions in which what very easily could have been a simple legislative fix became difficult as 
a result of ongoing litigation”). Ms. Rogers’ predictions do not appear to have been borne out 
in this case. 
 134. Complaint at 1, 3, DiSimone v. Cal. Dep’t of Tax and Fee Admin., 2018 Cal. Super. 
LEXIS 1814 (Jan. 29, 2018) (No. 16CV293099); see also Jennifer Wadsworth, Fight Over 
Absurd ‘Tampon Tax’ Continues in California Court, SAN JOSE INSIDE (Sept. 20, 2016), 
https://www.sanjoseinside.com/2016/09/20/fight-over-absurd-tampon-tax-continues-in-calif 
ornia-court [https://perma.cc/5TMB-HEG5]. 
 135. See Class Action Complaint, Rowitz v. Ohio, No. 16CV003518 (Ohio C.P. Apr. 11, 
2016). 
 136. Complaint, supra note 127, at 15; Class Action Complaint, supra note 135, at 13. 
 137. Compare, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Rowitz v. Ohio, No. 2016-00197JD (Ohio Ct. 
of Cl. Mar. 14, 2016) (labeling one cause of action “Inapplicable Tax and Arbitrary, Capri-
cious, Legally Deficient Determination Against All Defendants”), with Complaint, supra 
note 113, at 12 (using identical heading “Inapplicable Tax and Arbitrary, Capricious, Le-
gally Deficient Determination Against All Defendants”). The defendants in the Ohio case 
cited the similarities between the complaints in the Ohio and New York cases in their mo-
tion to Dismiss. See Motion to Dismiss of Defendant States of Ohio, Ohio Department of 
CRAWFORDWALDMAN 532 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/2018 1:37 PM 
2019] UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAMPON TAX 465 
D.  California: Dismissal and Dicta 
DiSimone v. California resembled the New York and Florida 
cases in that it sought injunctive relief, refund of prior taxes paid, 
and attorneys’ fees and costs.138 As in Seibert and Wendell, the com-
plaint alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the 
United States Constitution and state constitution.139 It asserted 
that the California tax on menstrual hygiene products is “not only 
discriminatory in intent and disparate in impact, it is arbitrary, 
capricious, and irrational. This sales tax is not substantially re-
lated to the advancement of any important government inter-
est.”140 In a separate filing in DiSimone, a doctor emphasized that 
California imposes sales tax on menstrual hygiene products while 
simultaneously exempting Viagra as a medical necessity.141 
Initially, the plaintiffs sued the state of California, the governor, 
and, individually and in a representative capacity, the director of 
the California State Board of Equalization, the entity responsible 
for administering the state’s tax system.142 The court dismissed, as 
improper parties, the governor and the director of the Board of 
Equalization.143 The court permitted the plaintiff to substitute the 
California Department of Tax and Fee Administration in lieu of the 
Board of Equalization.144 The parties then cross-moved for sum-
mary judgment.145 The court granted the defendant’s motion on 
 
Taxation, Joseph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner of Ohio & Joseph W. Testa Individually at 1 
n.1, Rowitz v. Ohio, No. 16CV003518 (Ohio C.P. June 16, 2016). 
 138. See Complaint, supra note 134, at 15.  
 139. Id. at 13.  
 140. Id. at 3. 
 141. Declaration of Felice L. Gersh, M.D. in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 5, DiSimone, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1814 (No. CGC-16-552458). Unlike the 
New York or Florida complaints, the California complaint included claims of an alleged vi-
olations of plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
violation of her federal civil rights. Complaint, supra note 134, at 3. However, this article 
focuses on the complaint’s equal protection argument. 
 142. Complaint, supra note 134, at 1; see About BOE, CAL. STATE BD. EQUALIZATION, 
https://www.boe.ca.gov/info/about.htm [https://perma.cc/D97G-R4XA] (last visited Dec. 1, 
2018) (stating that the Board of Equalization’s mission is “to serve the public through fair, 
effective, and efficient tax administration”). 
 143. Orders Sustaining Demurrers with Leave to Amend & Setting Case Management 
Conference at 1, 10, DiSimone, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1814 (No. CGC-16-552458). 
 144. Order Granting Substitution of Defendant, DiSimone, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1814 
(No. CGC-16-552458). 
 145. California Department of Tax & Fee Administration’s Notice of Motion & Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 1–2, DiSimone, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1814 (No. CGC-16-
552458); Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion & Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alterna-
tive, Summary Adjudication at 1–2, DiSimone, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1814 (No. CGC-16-
CRAWFORDWALDMAN 532 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/2018 1:37 PM 
466 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:439 
procedural grounds.146 The court reasoned that the proper taxpay-
ers to seek a refund were the retailers who had paid the tax to the 
State of California, and that individual retail consumers could seek 
relief directly from the state only in limited circumstances that 
were not available in this case.147 
Having dismissed the case on grounds that the wrong plaintiffs 
had sued, the court could have stopped there. Instead, the court 
subsequently explained in dicta why it viewed California’s tampon 
tax as constitutional.148 In so doing, the court did not explore the 
argument—developed more fully below—that the tampon tax is so 
closely tied to women’s biology that it can be viewed as a facially 
sex-based classification.149 Instead, it analyzed the tax only 
through a disparate impact lens, concluding that there was insuf-
ficient evidence of disparate impact and no evidence of discrimina-
tory intent.150 As discussed below, this analysis is incomplete.151 
The California court failed to engage the facial classification argu-
ment (which the pleadings had not made explicitly), oversimplified 
the facial neutrality argument (also not explicit in the pleadings), 
and was too conclusory in accepting that California has a rational 
basis for excluding menstrual hygiene products from the list of ex-
empted necessities. We explore those issues in greater depth in 
Part IV. 
E.  Ohio: Administrative Appeal and Judicial Inactivity 
In March 2016, four plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit, argu-
ing that the Ohio state sales tax on menstrual hygiene products 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the state and federal con-
stitutions.152 In the alternative, the plaintiffs sought to have men-
strual hygiene products brought within the definition of tax-free 
“drugs,” defined in the state sales tax law as including a “substance 
 
552458). 
 146. Order Granting Motion of California Department of Tax & Fee Administration for 
Summary Judgment & Denying Motion of Plaints for Summary Judgment at 3–4, 
DiSimone, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1814 (No. CGC-16-552455).  
 147. Id. at 4. 
 148. Id. at 4–9. 
 149. See id; see also infra Part IV.A. 
 150. Order Granting Motion, supra note 146, at 6–7  (“[W]e do not know if men or women 
generally bear a heavier tax burden as a result of all the various products which are, and 
are not, exempt.”). 
 151. See infra Part IV. 
 152. Class Action Complaint, supra note 137, at 1–2.  
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that is intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body.”153 Like their counterparts in New York, Florida, and Cali-
fornia, the Ohio plaintiffs also sought a refund for sales tax paid in 
the past and attorneys’ fees and costs.154 
The defendants, the Ohio Department of Taxation and Joseph 
Testa, individually and as Tax Commissioner of Ohio, moved to 
dismiss the case on the grounds that the Ohio statute required the 
plaintiffs first to file a claim for a sales tax refund with the Ohio 
State Tax Commissioner, which they had not done.155 Before the 
court ruled on the motion, the defendants filed either to dismiss 
the case or alternatively, to stay the proceedings until the plaintiffs 
concluded their administrative appeals.156 The court granted the 
stay while the plaintiffs requested a refund from the Ohio Board of 
Tax Appeals.157 
The Ohio Board of Tax Appeals denied the taxpayers’ application 
to the Ohio Tax Commissioner for a refund of sales tax paid on 
menstrual hygiene products.158 The taxpayers have filed a notice 
of appeal to the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals; therefore, 
the Court of Common Pleas case is currently marked as “inactive,” 
pending that appeal.159 The basis for the appeal is three-fold: first, 
the plaintiff’s claim that the Ohio sales tax on menstrual hygiene 
products violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and 
state constitutions; second, that the classification of tampons as 
medical devices by the federal Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) preempts any other classification for state law purposes; 
 
 153. Class Action Amended Complaint at 1–2, 4, Rowitz v. Ohio, No. 16CV003518 (Ohio 
C.P. Apr. 20, 2016) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01 (2016)). And like their California 
counterparts, the Ohio plaintiffs sought a declaration that the tampon tax violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and a finding of a § 1983 violation of federal civil 
rights. See id. at 12; Complaint, supra note 134, at 3. 
 154. Class Action Amended Complaint, supra note 153, at 13; see supra Part II.E. 
 155. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 137, at 2–6. 
 156. Second Motion to Dismiss & Motion to Stay of Defendants State of Ohio, Ohio De-
partment of Taxation & Joseph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner of Ohio at 1–2, Rowitz v. Ohio, 
No. 16CV003518 (Ohio C.P. Jan. 13, 2017). 
 157. Entry Granting Stay, Rowitz v. Ohio, No. 16CV003518 (Ohio. C.P. Nov. 22, 2017). 
 158. Decision and Order, Rowitz v. Testa, Nos. 2017-250, 2017-251, 2017-252, 2017-253 
(Ohio B.T.A. Feb. 20, 2018); Defendants State of Ohio, Ohio Department of Taxation & Jo-
seph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner of Ohio’s Notice of BTA Decision & Subsequent Appeal, 
Exhibit A, Rowitz v. Ohio, No. 16CV003518 (Ohio C.P. Mar. 19, 2018).  
159. Notice of Appeal Pursuant to Revised Code Section 5717.04, Rowitz v. Testa, No. 
18-AP-000191 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2018); see Case Information Online, FRANKLIN 
COUNTY CLERK COURTS, https://fcdcfcjs.co.franklin.oh.us/CaseInformationOnline/name 
Search [https://perma.cc/6B4V-VHDS] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (search “Rowitz”) (listing 
case number 16-CV-003518 as inactive).  
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and, third, that menstrual hygiene products should be classified 
for state law as “drugs,” “durable medical equipment,” or “pros-
thetic devices,” and thus exempt from taxation.160 
The preemption argument is weak, as there is no reason to think 
that an FDA definition would control for purposes of state sales tax 
law, which is in the exclusive domain of the taxing state.161 And 
the attempt to shoehorn menstrual hygiene products into the defi-
nition of drugs, durable medical equipment, or prosthetic devices 
strains statutory interpretation beyond plain meaning (although 
the relevant definition of “drugs” is so broad that it could conceiv-
ably include menstrual hygiene products).162 The equal protection 
argument, however, is strong and it is there that we now turn. 
III.  RELEVANT EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court has long recognized sex as a suspect classi-
fication for equal protection purposes, such that facially sex-based 
governmental distinctions receive heightened review.163 Although 
sex-based classifications do not trigger strict scrutiny, they do trig-
ger intermediate scrutiny, which means that the classifications 
 
 160. Notice of Appeal, supra note 159 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01(FFF), 
(HHH), (JJJ) (2007 & Supp. 2018)). 
161. For a sample of relevant scholarship on federalism, see, for example, Heather K. 
Gerkin, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85 (2014); Erin Ryan, Feder-
alism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional 
Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive 
Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005).  
 162. For a sample of relevant scholarship on statutory interpretation, see, for example, 
RONALD B. BROWN & SHARON J. BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT 1–3 (2002) (explaining the importance of statutory interpretation); 
William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 
(2017); William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 539 (2017); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 
(1990); Abbe Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010); Abbe R. Gluck & 
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—an Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons (pts. 1 & 2), 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013), 
66 STAN L. REV. 725 (2014); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive 
Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV 1189 (2006).  
 163. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that “classifications by gender 
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives,” i.e., pass intermediate scrutiny); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion) (stating that classifications based on sex should “be sub-
jected to close judicial scrutiny”). 
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must be substantially related to an important governmental pur-
pose.164 In United States v. Virginia,165 the Supreme Court empha-
sized the stringent nature of this review, describing it as “skeptical 
scrutiny” that requires an “exceedingly persuasive justification” to 
be satisfied.166 
In comparison to facial sex-based classifications, it is harder to 
challenge facially neutral governmental distinctions that have a 
disparate impact as to sex. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,167 a showing of disparate 
impact as to gender is not itself sufficient to trigger intermediate 
scrutiny. A plaintiff must also prove discriminatory intent.168  
Feeney involved a challenge to Massachusetts’ veteran prefer-
ence statute, with the plaintiffs claiming it violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.169 Under the stat-
ute, all veterans who qualified for state civil service positions had 
to be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonvet-
erans.170 This had a hugely disparate impact on women; at the time 
the Feeney litigation began in 1975, veterans comprised over 25% 
of the Massachusetts population, and over 98% of the veterans 
were male.171  
Still, the Court ruled that there was no equal protection viola-
tion, because the challengers could not show that “a gender-based 
discriminatory purpose ha[d], at least in some measure, shaped the 
Massachusetts veterans’ preference legislation.”172 The Court ex-
plained that “the State intended nothing more than to prefer ‘vet-
erans’” and that the “intent to exclude women from significant pub-
lic jobs was not at work in this law.”173 The Court acknowledged 
that the Massachusetts legislature likely was aware that most vet-
erans were men, but explained that this was not enough: to win, 
 
 164. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
 165. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 166. Id. at 531 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogen, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). 
 167. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 168. Id. at 274. 
 169. Id. at 259. 
 170. Id. at 261–63 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7 (1976)).   
 171. Id. at 270. 
 172. Id. at 276, 281. 
 173. Id. at 277. 
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the plaintiffs needed to show that the legislature “selected or reaf-
firmed [this] particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ 
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon” women.174 
The question of whether a law draws a facial classification based 
on sex, therefore, is critical. Often, the answer is obvious: the stat-
utory text itself explicitly references sex or gender.175 Sometimes, 
however, it is a closer call whether a classification is facially sex-
based. That was the case in Geduldig v. Aiello.176  
Geduldig involved state and federal equal protection challenges 
to California’s disability insurance system, which was funded by 
automatic paycheck deductions and insured “against the risk of 
disability stemming from a substantial number of ‘mental or phys-
ical illness[es] and mental or physical injur[ies].’”177 The statute 
did not cover disabilities lasting fewer than eight days, and the 
benefits did not extend beyond twenty-six weeks.178 Most disabili-
ties were covered, but the system excluded disabilities resulting 
from alcoholism, drug addiction, sexual psychopathy, and normal 
pregnancies, although disabilities resulting from abnormal preg-
nancy complications (such as ectopic pregnancies) were covered.179 
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that, in excluding cov-
erage for disabilities from typical pregnancies, the system was en-
gaging in invidious sex discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause.180 The Court explained in a footnote: 
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from ben-
efit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical con-
dition—pregnancy—from the list of compensable disabilities. While it 
is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that 
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based 
classification . . . . Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable 
physical condition with unique characteristics . . . . The lack of iden-
tity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this 
insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The 
program divides potential recipients into two groups—pregnant 
 
 174. Id. at 279. 
 175. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 59–61 (2001) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to a statute that imposed different requirements for a 
child’s acquisition of citizenship depending on whether the citizen parent was the mother or 
father). 
 176. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).  
 177. Id. at 487–88. 
 178. Id. at 488. 
 179. Id. at 489, 493. 
 180. Id. at 494. 
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women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively 
female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and ac-
tuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both 
sexes.181 
Many commentators and legislators immediately disagreed with 
Geduldig.182 Four years after Geduldig was decided, Congress 
amended Title VII to clarify that its prohibition of discrimination 
based on sex included pregnancy discrimination.183 But, of course, 
Congress could not amend the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the Equal Protection Clause, and so Geduldig technically remains 
applicable to constitutional claims even though it is irrelevant to 
employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII. 
More recently, some commentators have suggested that the Su-
preme Court has, at least implicitly, moved beyond Geduldig’s rea-
soning. Neil and Reva Siegel, for example, point to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. 
Hibbs,184 where the Court recognized the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (“FMLA”) as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to en-
force the Equal Protection Clause on grounds that the FMLA enti-
tled both male and female employees to take leaves in connection 
with the arrival of a new baby, and would thus arguably prevent 
employers from viewing childcare solely as women’s work.185 The 
Hibbs Court thus acknowledged, Siegel and Siegel argue, that “un-
constitutional sex stereotyping has shaped laws governing preg-
nant women as well as new mothers.”186 They conclude that 
“[w]here the Court was once inclined to view the regulation of preg-
nant women as presumptively benign, the Court is now more quick 
 
 181. Id. at 496–97 n.20. 
 182. David L. Kirp & Dorothy Robyn, Pregnancy, Justice, and the Justices, 57 TEX. L. 
REV. 947, 948, 951, 954 (1979); see, e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: 
Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 
442–43, 482 (1975).  
 183. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) states that:  
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited 
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, includ-
ing receipt of benefits under fringe benefits programs, as other persons not so 
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. 
 184. 538 U.S. 721, 722 (2003). 
 185. See Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping: From 
Struck to Carhart, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1095, 1106 (2009).  
 186. Id. at 1107.  
CRAWFORDWALDMAN 532 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/2018 1:37 PM 
472 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:439 
to recognize constitutional concerns at stake.”187 This evolution, 
they suggest, brings Geduldig’s reasoning into question. 
Moving beyond the pregnancy context, Holning Lau and Hillary 
Li have argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges,188 which struck down same-sex marriage bans, also casts 
doubt on Geduldig’s approach.189 Lau and Li point out that alt-
hough Geduldig “concluded that there was no sex discrimination 
because not all women are, or will ever be, pregnant . . . Obergefell 
was much less concerned about the fact that some gays and lesbi-
ans are neither interested nor ever will be interested in getting 
married.”190 In other words, the Obergefell Court focused less on 
whether every gay person was specifically and tangibly affected by 
the same-sex marriage bans, and instead emphasized the aggre-
gate and symbolic effect of the ban. We draw on these arguments, 
along with others, in explaining below why Geduldig should not 
foreclose viewing the tampon tax as unconstitutionally sex-based. 
IV.  WHY THE TAMPON TAX IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL  
SEX-BASED TAX 
The tampon tax straddles the divide between the “facial classifi-
cation” and “facial neutrality” scenarios. The sales tax systems in 
the thirty-five states that impose the tampon tax do not explicitly 
mention women when they classify menstrual hygiene products as 
“taxable” and other necessities as “exempt.”191 However, in the 
same way that comparatively unfavorable tax treatment of yar-
mulkes would be viewed as a tax on Jews (even if the word “Jew” 
did not appear in the legislation), so too should a tax on menstrual 
hygiene products—in the context of a tax system that exempts 
other “necessities”—be understood as a tax on women. Indeed, as 
we discuss further below, the most appropriate analysis of the tam-
pon tax is as a facial sex-based classification. Moreover, the facial 
 
 187. Id. at 1113. 
 188. 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 189. See Holning Lau & Hillary Li, American Equal Protection and Global Convergence, 
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1261–63 (2017) (noting that the Obergefell Court focused on the 
discriminatory impact of same-sex marriage bans). 
 190. Id. at 1263. 
 191. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-39.2-04(26)(d)(2) (2018) (providing sales tax exemp-
tion for “incontinent pad and pants” used by “a person with bladder dysfunction”). Men-
strual hygiene products are subject to taxation because they are not specifically exempt. See 
id. § 57-39.2-04.  
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neutrality framework also supports the argument that the tampon 
tax is unconstitutional. As applied to the tampon tax, there is an 
important synergy between the facial classification and facial neu-
trality frameworks. 
A.  The Facial Classification Model 
Geduldig initially poses a challenge to the argument that the 
tampon tax should be viewed as a facial sex-based classification. 
After all, Geduldig held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related 
conditions from disability coverage did not amount to facial dis-
crimination against women.192 If pregnancy (and its associated dis-
abilities) does not count as a proxy for female sex, why should men-
struation (and its associated products)? Litigators challenging the 
tampon tax as unconstitutional must have a satisfactory answer to 
that question. 
Without endorsing Geduldig’s holding, we contend that there 
are numerous reasons why pregnancy is distinguishable from the 
tampon tax. First, it is important to recognize that Geduldig pre-
dated the fully fleshed-out modern approach to sex discrimination 
cases, where facial classifications immediately trigger intermedi-
ate scrutiny. Geduldig was decided in 1974, two years before the 
Supreme Court decided Craig v. Boren, which recognized interme-
diate scrutiny as the test for sex-based classifications.193 Of course, 
even as of 1974, the Supreme Court had suggested that certain dif-
ferential treatment based on sex should trigger heightened re-
view.194 But the lack of clarity on what heightened review should 
involve, and how stringent it should be, arguably muddied the 
Geduldig Court’s analysis. The majority opinion was short, and did 
not fully grapple with the question of whether disfavorable treat-
ment of pregnancy amounted to disfavorable treatment of women. 
Rather, the Court conclusorily relied on an oddly drawn distinction 
 
 192. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494, 497 (1974).  
 193. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing intermediate scrutiny as 
standard for evaluating sex-based statutory classifications). Tellingly, at the time Geduldig 
was decided, some commentators interpreted it as applying only rational basis review to 
sex-based classifications. See, e.g., Lois B. Gordon, Pre-Marriage Name Change, Resump-
tion, and Reregistration Statutes, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1508, 1512 n.13 (1974).  
 194. The Geduldig Court acknowledged this, and deemed “this case . . . a far cry from 
cases like Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson, involving discrimination based upon 
gender as such.” Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (citations omitted). 
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between “pregnant women” and “nonpregnant persons”195—a dis-
tinction that, according to Kenji Yoshino, has “elicited disbelieving 
and pained laughter from generations of my Constitutional Law 
students.”196 Tellingly, the Geduldig majority itself—in stating 
that even “the most cursory analysis”197 supported its conclusion—
implicitly admitted that it was not doing much more than that. 
Second, as scholars like Reva Siegel, Neil Siegel, Holning Lau, 
and Hillary Li have observed, various aspects of more recent Su-
preme Court decisions have called Geduldig’s reasoning into ques-
tion. As discussed above, these scholars show how, in both the 
pregnancy and the same-sex marriage contexts, the Court has 
moved away from the formalism that characterized Geduldig.198 
Instead, the Court has focused on the underlying stereotyping and 
aggregate effect of the laws being challenged.199 This shift further 
supports the argument that Geduldig’s formalism should not pre-
vent courts from viewing a tax on menstrual hygiene products as a 
functional tax on women. 
Third, even under Geduldig’s own cursory reasoning, menstrua-
tion (and its related products) should still fare better than preg-
nancy (and its related disabilities). Under the Geduldig Court’s ap-
proach, the California program did not discriminate against 
women writ large, because “pregnancy is an objectively identifiable 
physical condition with unique characteristics,” with most women 
falling, at any given time, into the category of “nonpregnant per-
sons.”200 Today, pregnancy in the United States is even less fre-
quent than it was at the time of Geduldig; in 2017, the United 
States fertility rate fell to a record low of 60.2 births per 1000 
women of childbearing age, down 3% from 2016.201 The total fertil-
ity rate is down to 1.84 births per woman.202 Thus, now more than 
ever, women spend the vast majority of their lives as “nonpregnant 
persons.”  
 
 195. Id. at 496–97 n.20 
 196. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 782 (2011).  
 197. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n.20. 
 198. See supra notes 184–90 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra notes 184–90 and accompanying text.  
 200. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496–97 n.20. 
 201. Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Fertility Rate Fell to a Record Low, for a Second Straight 
Year, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/us/fertility-rate-de 
cline-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/VB8V-ZP22]. 
 202. Claire Cain Miller, The U.S. Fertility Rate Is Down, Yet More Women Are Mothers, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/upshot/the-us-fertility-ra 
te-is-down-yet-more-women-are-mothers.html [https://perma.cc/7NH3-D4ZG]. 
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By contrast, menstruation is a regular occurrence in most 
women’s lives from, on average, the ages of thirteen to fifty-one.203 
According to a recent study by the Association of Reproductive 
Health Professionals, women currently have an estimated 450 pe-
riods during their lifetime.204 One recent analysis concluded that 
the average woman spends roughly 2280 days (6.25 years) men-
struating.205 Therefore, Geduldig’s approach of dividing women 
into those who were affected and those who were not (i.e., “preg-
nant women” versus “nonpregnant persons”) makes even less 
sense in the context of menstruation. Unlike pregnancy, menstru-
ation is a consistent, unavoidable aspect of most women’s lives for 
an average of four decades. Menstruation is thus an even stronger 
proxy for female sex than is pregnancy. 
Fourth, the Geduldig Court gave two policy justifications for 
California’s exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from its dis-
ability insurance program, neither of which are applicable to the 
tampon tax.206 The Court suggested that the cost of covering all 
instances of temporary disability “accompanying normal preg-
nancy and delivery” would be so large as to require restructuring 
California’s entire program.207 By contrast, the tampon tax is a rel-
atively small feature of state sales taxation systems; adding men-
strual hygiene products to the already-existing lists of exempted 
products is highly unlikely to bankrupt state treasuries.208 
 
 203. See Kane, supra note 85.  
 204. See supra note 86–88 and accompanying text (estimating the time that the average 
woman spends menstruating over the course of her lifetime).  
 205. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 206. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 493–94 (1974).  
 207. Id. at 493. The Geduldig Court stated that even if California were overstating the 
case that it would be “impossible” to maintain the program if it covered pregnancies, the 
program would need to change one or more significant variables, such as “the benefit level 
deemed appropriate to compensate employee disability, the risks selected to be insured un-
der the program, and the contribution rate chosen to maintain the solvency of the program 
and at the same time to permit low-income employees to participate with minimal personal 
sacrifice.” Id. at 493–94. The Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause did not re-
quire “such policies to be sacrificed or compromised.” Id. at 494. 
 208. By way of illustration, the California state budget for 2018 to 2019 is greater than 
$201 billion. Welcome to 2018–19 State Budget, CAL. BUDGET, http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/ 
budget/2018-19EN/ [https://perma.cc/9PQ4-A4FL] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018); see also 
EDMUND G. BROWN JR., CALIFORNIA STATE BUDGET 2018–2019, at 18–20, http://www.ebud 
get.ca.gov/2018-19/pdf/Enacted/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/X24D-4ETQ]. According to one recent estimate, the State of California collects approxi-
mately $20 million in taxes associated with the sale of menstrual hygiene products. Nicole 
Kaeding, Tampon Taxes: Do Feminine Hygiene Products Deserve a Sales Tax Exemption?, 
TAX FOUND. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/tampon-taxes-sales-tax/ [https://perm 
acc/D57T-MKV5]. Thus, tampon tax revenue in California represents less than 0.011% of 
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Geduldig also emphasized the lack of evidence that the current 
version of the disability program was benefitting men more than 
women, noting that even with the pregnancy exclusion, women 
were still “contribut[ing] about 28 percent of the total disability in-
surance fund and receiv[ing] back about 38 percent of the fund in 
benefits.”209 This, too, contrasts with the tampon tax situation cur-
rently occurring in many states, where male-specific items like 
spermicidal condoms are exempted from taxation, even while men-
strual hygiene products are not.210 
Finally, we note that Geduldig itself did not say that pregnancy-
related classifications never amounted to sex-based classifications; 
it merely said that not “every legislative classification concerning 
pregnancy is a sex-based classification.”211 If Geduldig left the door 
open for even some legislative classifications concerning pregnancy 
to qualify as sex-based classifications, the door should be equally 
(if not more) open for legislative classifications concerning men-
struation to qualify. 
For all of these reasons, it is inaccurate to interpret Geduldig as 
foreclosing the tampon tax’s treatment as a sex-based classifica-
tion. Indeed, the sex-based classification model is the most apt 
framework here. Just as the exclusion of yarmulkes from a “reli-
gious clothing” tax exemption would be a tax on Jews, the exclusion 
of menstrual hygiene products from the various necessity-based 
tax exemptions constitutes a tax on women. 
B.  The Facial Neutrality Model 
Although the facial classification model does most of the work, 
the facial neutrality model also contributes to the argument that 
the tampon tax should trigger intermediate scrutiny. Under the 
facial neutrality model, as discussed above, both disparate impact 
and discriminatory intent must be shown to move from rational 
basis into intermediate scrutiny.212 Here, the disparate impact 
demonstration is straightforward, since there is no question that 
 
the state’s budget. 
 209. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 499 n.21 (quoting the lower court’s decision in Aiello v. Han-
sen, 359 F. Supp. 782, 800 (N.D. Cal. 1973)). 
 210. See supra Part I.B. 
 211. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (emphasis added).  
 212. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.  
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menstrual hygiene products are used primarily or exclusively by 
women.213 
That men sometimes purchase these products for women does 
not change the analysis. As the Federal Circuit recently explained 
in Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States,214 which involved a chal-
lenge to a tariff that imposed a higher duty rate on men’s leather 
gloves than other gloves: 
It may be, as the Court of International Trade suggested, that the tar-
iff does not discriminate between male and female purchasers of 
gloves because women buy men’s gloves for men and men buy women’s 
gloves for women. But this comparison entirely misses the point. The 
claimed discrimination is based on the sex of the glove users, not the 
sex of the glove purchasers . . . . Under the theory of purchaser equal-
ity, generally imposing a higher tax on vehicles purchased for female 
users would raise no constitutional questions if both men and women 
equally purchased the vehicles in question. Any such theory is unten-
able.215 
The bigger challenge under the facial neutrality model is show-
ing discriminatory intent. We are not aware of any “smoking gun” 
evidence that the tampon tax resulted from a conscious, inten-
tional desire to harm women.216 However, it is logical to infer that 
various states’ tax treatment of menstrual hygiene products as 
nonnecessities is the result of a combination of indifference, lack of 
understanding, and discomfort with discussions about or consider-
ation of women’s biological processes.217 Indeed, when a popular 
YouTube personality asked then-President Barack Obama about 
the tampon tax, he responded: “I have to tell you, I have no idea 
 
 213. For potential uses of tampons by men, see Neil Hill, 10 Reasons Why Men Should 
Carry a Tampon, GOOD MEN PROJECT (May 28, 2018), https://goodmenproject.com/fea 
tured-content/nhe-10-reasons-why-men-should-carry-a-tampon [https://perma.cc/R5YM-
BV95] (listing “[p]lugging a puncture wound,” “[s]tarting a fire,” and making “[b]lister plas-
ter” among reasons for a man to carry a tampon; having a tampon on hand for a woman who 
may need one is not among the listed reasons for a man to have tampons on hand). 
 214. 594 F.3d 1346, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 830 (2010). 
 215. Id. at 1355. 
 216. E.g., Telephone Interview with Arthur R. Rosen, Partner, McDermott, Will & Em-
ery (July 6, 2016) (“In my heart of hearts, I do not believe that the tax administrators in 
New York had any discriminatory intent in mind. I believe that there was an effort to im-
plement a very technical definition of the statutory exemption and that is the reason we 
have the situation with the feminine hygiene products being subject to tax.”); Crawford, 
supra note 130 (hypothesizing that the Florida legislation’s then-failure to exempt men-
strual hygiene products from sales tax did not result from legislators’ specific goal to harm 
women; rather “they simply did not give it sufficient thought”).  
 217. See Hartman, supra note 87, at 349–50 (arguing that the tampon tax is connected 
to “misunderstandings about women’s biology”). 
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why states would tax these as luxury items. I suspect it’s because 
men were making the laws when those taxes were passed.”218 
Various menstrual taboos—and notions of menstruation as un-
clean and very private—date back millennia, across numerous cul-
tures.219 Even today in the United States, euphemisms are fre-
quently used for menstrual periods220 and advertisements for 
menstrual hygiene products typically demonstrate absorbency us-
ing blue liquid rather than a red substance that realistically illus-
trates menstrual blood.221 The invisibility of menstruation in our 
 
 218. Reflect, Ingrid Nilsen Interviews Obama, YOUTUBE (Jan. 16, 2016), https:// 
youtu.be/K2Oaa WjB6S8 [https://perma.cc/4CE4-EKSA]; see also Prachi Gupta, Obama: 
Tampon Tax Probably Exists Because Only Dudes Were Making Laws, COSMOPOLITAN (Jan. 
15, 2016), http:// www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/news/a52262/president-obama-respondsto-
tampon-tax/ [https://perma.cc/7EAK-KARY]; Maya Rhoden, President Obama Doesn’t Un-
derstand the ‘Tampon Tax’ Either, TIME (Jan. 15, 2016), http://time.com/4183108/obama-
tampon-tax-san itary/ [https://perma.cc/L8SR-B9RR]; Sade Strehlke, Watch YouTube Star 
Ingrid Nilsen School President Obama on the “Tampon Tax,” TEEN VOGUE (Jan. 20, 2016), 
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/ingrid-nilsen-obama-tampon-tax [https://perma.cc/Y8RQ-
FRR9].   
 219. E.g., WEISS-WOLF, supra note 91, at 5–11 (describing ancient and contemporary re-
ligious and cultural “distrust, even disgust for women’s monthly blood”); see also Kay Stand-
ing & Sara L. Parker, Girls and Women’s Rights to Menstrual Health in Nepal, in 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON WOMEN’S ISSUES AND RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 156, 
157–61 (Nazmunnessa Mahtab et al. eds., 2017); Nikita Arora, Menstruation in India: Ide-
ology, Politics, and Capitalism, 23 ASIAN J. WOMEN’S STUD. 528 (2017); Verity Bowman, 
Woman in Nepal Dies After Being Exiled to Outdoor Hut During Her Period, GUARDIAN (Jan. 
12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jan/12/woman-nepal-dies 
-exiled-outdoor-hut-period-menstruation [https://perma.cc/YR65-BDNP] (describing certain 
practices in parts of Nepal); Kena Holkar, How the Taboo Around Menstruation Is Rooted 
in Religion and Culture, YOUTH KI AWAAZ (May 18, 2018), https://www.youthkiawaaz.com/ 
2018/05/why-do-we-need-to-break-the-silence-around-menstrual-taboo [https://perma.cc/E 
K H4-62NW] (describing certain practices in parts of India). On the cultural construction of 
menstruating women as weak, unworthy and inferior to men, see Crawford & Spivack, su-
pra note 43, at 506, 508–12 (citing first-century Irish epic poetry, Shakespeare, contempo-
rary news and current events to demonstrate radical misunderstandings of menstruation). 
 220. See, e.g., Top Euphemisms for “Period” by Language, CLUE (Mar. 10, 2016), https:// 
helloclue.com/articles/culture/top-euphemisms-for-period-by-language [https://perma.cc/ZG 
8M-Z57M]; see also Roisin O’Connor, Menstruation Study Finds Over 5,000 Slang Terms for 
‘Period,’ INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/heal 
th-and-families/menstruation-study-finds-over-5000-slang-terms-for-period-a6905021. 
html [https://perma.cc/6TPC-XZ8C] (reporting, in connection with global survey of more 
than 90,000 people, that the top ten English-language euphemisms for menstruation are 
“[c]rimson wave,” “[m]other nature,” “[l]ady time,” “[a]unt flow,” “[t]ime of the month,” “[o]n 
the rag,” “[s]hark week,” “[r]ed tide,” “[c]ode red,” “[m]onthly friend,” “[h]aving the painters 
in,” “[b]loody [m]ary,” and “[b]lob” and noting that residents of France and China are among 
those most likely to speak about menstruation in slang terms, using euphemisms at a rate 
of 91%). 
 221. See Ann Bartow, Red Dot in Sanitary Napkin Advertisement Makes Her Story!, 
FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (July 6, 2011), https://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2011/07/ 
red-dot-sanitary-napkin-advertisement-makes-herstory [https://perma.cc/KK97-5KYL] (de-
scribing first use in advertising of menstrual hygiene product showing a red mark); Bridget 
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society has contributed, we believe, to the failure to affirmatively 
include menstrual hygiene products in the various tax exemptions 
for necessities. In other words, the failure to mention menstrual 
hygiene products on the list of exempted necessities is a foreseea-
ble result of the desire not to see, talk, or think about menstruation 
at all.222 And without the discussion and enumeration of menstrual 
hygiene products, it is hard for them to be singled out for inclusion 
on the tax-exempt list. Instead, they remain in the default category 
of taxable items. 
The tampon tax thus stands in contrast to other differential tax-
ation, such as the Totes-Isotoner case involving a higher tariff on 
men’s leather gloves.223 There, the Federal Circuit—after finding 
that this higher tariff had a disparate impact on men—concluded 
that there was still no equal protection violation because there was 
no indication of discriminatory intent.224 The court reasoned that 
although “[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews . . . . 
[m]en’s gloves are hardly an irrational object of disfavor, and a tax 
on them creates no compelling inference that Congress intended to 
discriminate against men.”225  
Menstruation and its related products, however, have long been 
an irrational object of disfavor.226 Moreover, menstrual hygiene 
products are much more closely associated with women than are 
leather gloves with men, making it easier to infer some level of dis-
criminatory intent. (Indeed, these products are often referred to as 
“feminine hygiene products.”) The tampon tax is thus much more 
analogous to a yarmulke tax than to a tax on men’s leather gloves. 
  
 
Crawford, Women Don’t Bleed Blue (Even Yalies and Members of the Social Register), 
FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (Oct. 28, 2017),  https://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2017/10/ 
women-dont-bleed-blue-even-yalies-and-members-of-the-social-register [https://perma.cc/4 
VTK-SHAX] (detailing controversy over a United Kingdom ad for menstrual hygiene prod-
uct that used red instead of blue liquid to illustrate absorbency). 
 222. It is notable that even Massachusetts—one of the few states not to impose a tampon 
tax—does not even include menstrual hygiene products on its statutory list of exempted 
products; they are only mentioned in the official Massachusetts Department of Revenue 
Guide. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 223. 594 F.3d 1346, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 224. Id. at 1354–55, 1357–58. 
 225. Id. at 1358 (quoting Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 
(1993)).  
 226. See Crawford & Spivack, supra note 43, at 508–11 (describing manifestations of 
ignorance and anxiety about women’s bodies arising out of “the specter of a specifically fe-
male adult who cannot control bodily effluvia”). 
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Additionally, it is important to note that in other unsuccessful 
disparate impact cases like Feeney, there was at least a genuine 
public policy interest motivating the differential treatment.227 For 
example, in Feeney, there was no debate that a veterans’ preference 
policy for civil service positions served significant policy goals, not-
withstanding the disparate impact on women.228 The tampon tax, 
however, serves no larger policy goal. Of course, the ultimate goal 
of the sales tax system is to bring in as much revenue as possible, 
and any exemption cuts against that goal. In light of all of the other 
exemptions, however—from true necessities to randomly favored 
items like garter belts229 and manicures230—it strains credulity to 
argue that the tampon tax is the cornerstone of a state’s sales tax 
system. Indeed, as discussed below, excluding tampons from a re-
gime where other necessities are tax-exempt does not pass even 
rational basis review. 
Finally, the Supreme Court has itself backed away slightly from 
the “intent” requirement in some recent cases. As Carlos Ball has 
written, the Obergefell Court did not focus on “the intent or moti-
vation[s]” behind the same-sex marriage bans; instead, it “fo-
cuse[d] on the effects” of the laws.231 Lau and Li situate Obergefell 
in the context of several other recent opinions that have “blur[red] 
the line between facial discrimination and disparate impact,”232 
such as retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Lawrence v. Texas.233 In Lawrence, Justice O’Connor viewed 
Texas’s criminalization of same-sex sodomy as an equal protection 
violation even though it technically applied to everyone and did not 
mention sexual orientation.234 Justice O’Connor “did not resort to 
analyzing motive,” Lau and Li write.235 “Instead, she tersely stated 
that engaging in same-sex sodomy is ‘closely correlated with being 
homosexual’ and, therefore, that the law is discriminatory. Put dif-
ferently, Justice O’Connor’s conclusion stems from the nature of 
 
227. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979) (explaining Massachu-
setts’ veterans’ preference statute). 
 228. See id. (describing the veterans’ preference statute and its disparate impact on 
women). 
 229. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Carlos A. Ball, Bigotry and Same-Sex Marriage, 84 UMKC L. REV. 639, 649 (2016).  
 232. Lau & Li, supra note 189, at 1253, 1260–61. 
 233. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing 
that Texas’ anti-sodomy law had the effect of discriminating against homosexual people).  
 234. Id. at 581.  
 235. Lau & Li, supra note 189, at 1261.  
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the law’s impact on homosexuals, regardless of the law’s motiva-
tions.”236 In a forthcoming essay, Lau similarly emphasizes the 
shift from the reasoning in Loving v. Virginia—where the Supreme 
Court focused on the formal language of Virginia’s anti-miscegena-
tion law and its intent—to Obergefell’s focus on effects.237 This 
analysis further supports the argument that plaintiffs challenging 
the tampon tax should not have to uncover and prove the legisla-
tors’ precise intent in order to make the claim that the tampon tax 
should be struck down due to its disparate impact on women. 
Therefore, whether the tampon tax is viewed as a facial sex-
based classification or as a facially neutral classification with a dis-
parate impact on sex, it should trigger intermediate scrutiny. In-
deed, the facial classification and facial neutrality analyses here 
are mutually reinforcing and point toward that same conclusion. 
Just as the Obergefell Court blended aspects of the facial classifi-
cation and facial neutrality doctrines in holding that the same-sex 
marriage bans violated the Equal Protection Clause, so too they 
can be intertwined here. The tampon tax implicates both lines of 
reasoning, illustrating the problematic nature of the tax.  
C.  The Failure to Satisfy Intermediate Scrutiny 
Because the tampon tax should be viewed as a sex-based classi-
fication—under a facial classification model, a facial neutrality 
model, or a combination thereof—it should trigger intermediate 
scrutiny. And because it cannot satisfy intermediate scrutiny, it is 
unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court has been clear that intermediate scrutiny is 
a challenging standard. As noted above, in United States v. Vir-
ginia, Justice Ginsburg described it as “skeptical scrutiny” that re-
quires an “exceedingly persuasive justification.”238 There is no ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification for taxing menstrual hygiene 
products more heavily than other necessities. On the contrary, do-
ing so is precisely counter to the types of justifications that the Vir-
ginia Court said could pass intermediate scrutiny’s muster, includ-
ing “compensat[ing] women ‘for particular economic disabilities 
 
 236. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 534 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 237. Holning Lau, From Loving to Obergefell: Elevating the Significance of Discrimina-
tory Effects, 25 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa 
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3200809 [https://perma.cc/G86B-AFSK]. 
 238. 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
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[they have] suffered,’ ‘promot[ing] equal employment opportunity,’ 
[or] to advanc[ing] full development of the talent and capacities of 
our Nation’s people.”239 The tampon tax “perpetuate[s] the legal, 
social, and economic inferiority of women,” which is exactly what 
the Virginia Court deemed impermissible.240 
Indeed, the Court’s language in Virginia highlights precisely 
what is so problematic about the tampon tax. Rather than compen-
sating women for previous economic disabilities, the tax continues 
to harm them economically.241 And the tax sends the message that 
products enabling women to leave their house and participate in 
society are not necessities, but luxuries. The tax thus stifles the 
full development of women’s talent and capacities. It cannot sur-
vive intermediate scrutiny. 
V.  TAXATION AND INEQUALITY 
A.  Why the Tampon Tax Lacks a Rational Basis 
The refusal to treat menstrual hygiene products as necessities is 
likely connected to at least some level of animus toward the female 
biological process of menstruation.242 Therefore, even assuming ar-
guendo that the tampon tax is not viewed as a sex-based classifi-
cation triggering intermediate scrutiny, it should still fail rational 
basis review. Indeed, the tampon tax is reminiscent of the “rational 
basis with bite” Supreme Court cases, in which the Court applied 
rational basis review more stringently because it suspected that 
animus toward a disfavored group was playing a role in the chal-
lenged governmental classification.243 In United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture v. Moreno,244 for instance, Congress amended 
the Food Stamp Act to exclude from participation any household 
containing an individual who was unrelated to anyone else in the 
household.245 The Supreme Court held that this change violated 
 
 239. Id. at 533–34 (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 
(1987); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam)). 
 240. Id. at 534. 
 241. See supra Part I.B.  
 242. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 243. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term–Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 18–19 (1972) (describing the development of rational basis “with bite”).  
 244. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 245. Id. at 529–30. 
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the Equal Protection Clause, stating that it failed rational basis 
review because of the legislative history indicating that it was de-
signed to prevent people in “hippie communes” from receiving ben-
efits.246 Even though the change obviously would have saved the 
United States money—by reducing the number of benefit recipi-
ents—that fiscal effect alone was insufficient to save it.247 Simi-
larly, the tax revenue from the tampon tax should not be enough 
to sustain its constitutionality, particularly given that it likely 
stems from discomfort with menstruation, a natural biological pro-
cess of members of female sex. 
Procedurally, making menstrual hygiene products exempt from 
sales tax would not require a massive legislative overhaul, as illus-
trated by the five jurisdictions that have recently made the change. 
The thirty-five states that currently tax these products248 would 
merely need to modify their sales tax laws to move menstrual hy-
giene products into the category of tax-exempt “necessities” like 
prescription drugs and groceries or create a specific statutory ex-
emption for them.249 
B.  The Expressive Value of the Tampon Tax 
A society signals its values through the decisions it makes about 
whom and what to tax.250 Indeed, Windsor v. United States—the 
landmark Supreme Court case striking down the Defense of Mar-
riage Act (“DOMA”)—was a tax case.251 After Thea Speyer died in 
2009 and left her entire estate to her spouse, Edith Windsor, the 
 
 246. Id. at 534–35, 538. 
 247. Id. at 538. 
 248. See supra Part I.B.  
 249. See id.  
 250. Republican Congresswoman Jennifer Dunn of Washington framed the relationship 
between the tax system and it larger implications by asking, “How should we tax? Who 
should we tax? What should we tax? What values does our tax system reflect?” Jennifer 
Dunn, quoted in MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE 
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 42 (2005). Fordham Law Review recently sponsored 
a symposium and devoted an entire issue to discussion of the notion that “We Are What We 
Tax.” See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Foreword: We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2413, 2413–14 (2016); see also Kitty Richards, An Expressive Theory of Tax, 27 CORNELL J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 303 (2017) (“Like every other area of law, tax law offers policymakers 
a chance to give expression to the values of their constituents and themselves—and the 
values expressed by the tax code are at least as central to the tax policy preferences of citi-
zens, lawmakers, and judges as economic efficiency and the distribution of income.”). 
 251. 570 U.S. 744, 750–51, 775.  
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United States government denied the estate the benefit of the fed-
eral tax deduction that effectively allows for tax-free transfers to a 
surviving spouse.252 This denial resulted from section 3 of DOMA, 
which defined “marriage” as a union between one man and one 
woman only.253 Windsor was required to pay $363,500 in estate 
taxes that she would not have paid had she been in an opposite-sex 
marriage, and she sued for an estate tax refund.254 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled five to four in favor of the 
estate, declaring section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional.255 In ruling 
that DOMA failed to satisfy rational basis review, Justice Ken-
nedy’s majority opinion emphasized the affront to “the dignity and 
integrity of the person” by refusing same-sex married couples the 
same preferential tax treatment as opposite-sex married cou-
ples.256 Windsor thus illustrates how tax law can bring discrimina-
tion clearly into focus. The tax system’s choices about whom and 
 
 252. Id. at 750–51; see I.R.C. § 2056(a) (Supp. V 2018) (estate tax deduction for transfers 
to a surviving spouse). 
 253. Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012 & Supp. V 2018), invalidated by Wind-
sor, 570 U.S. 744 (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the 
United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite 
sex who is a husband or a wife.”). 
 254. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 750–53.  
 255. Id. at 747, 775. 
 256. Id. at 772 (“DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned mar-
riages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other 
reasons like governmental efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity 
and integrity of the person. And DOMA contrives to deprive some couples married under 
the laws of their State, but not other couples, of both rights and responsibilities. By creating 
two contradictory marriage regimes within the same State, DOMA forces same-sex couples 
to live as married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, 
thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has 
found it proper to acknowledge and protect.”). Noa Ben-Asher has critiqued the Windsor 
Court’s analysis as a form of “weak dignity.” Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Met-
amorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 243, 276–77 (2014) (“Wind-
sor’s dignity is . . . conferred by the State and at each state’s discretion . . . [it] is much nar-
rower in scope than contemporary theories of dignity promoted by legal and moral 
philosophers . . . [and it] comes with unnecessary rhetoric of injured subjects, a rhetoric that 
could perpetuate an attachment to injury by homosexual couples and other rights-seeking 
legal subjects.”). 
The majority opinion also relied on principles of federalism. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768 
(“DOMA rejects the long-established precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of 
marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State, though they may vary, sub-
ject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next. Despite these considerations, 
it is unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the 
Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance. The State’s power in defining the mar-
ital relation is of central relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism.”). 
For an analysis of the federalism rationale in Windsor, see Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, 
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what to tax not only reflect existing equalities or inequalities, but 
reinforce and perpetuate them.257 
That broader lens further clarifies why the tampon tax cannot 
pass intermediate scrutiny or even rational basis review. To be 
sure, having a robust sales tax base is necessary for the integrity 
of the system. The more exemptions that a legislature creates, the 
weaker the tax base is.258 Put differently, in order to generate max-
imum revenue, the greatest number of items should be subject to 
 
Federalism, and Family Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 156, 158 (2013), noting: 
[C]ivil rights advocates dodged a bullet when the Windsor Court declined to 
embrace the categorical family status federalism theory. While its acceptance 
would have brought along the short-term gain of providing a basis for invali-
dating DOMA, it also would have curtailed the ability of federal officials to 
protect same-sex couples and other families. 
Some scholars have criticized the majority opinion for failure to engage in a meaningful 
equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, From Romer v. Evans to United 
States v. Windsor: Law as a Vehicle for Moral Disapproval in Amendment 2 and the Defense 
of Marriage Act, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 351, 461 (2013) (noting that Justice Scalia’s 
dissent critiquing the majority opinion for failure to resolve the question of what level of 
review applies to a claimed violation of equal protection on the basis of sexual orientation is 
partially correct, insofar as “the majority declines to use Windsor as a vehicle to establish 
that constitutional theory” of equal protection”). For a demonstration of how Windsor could 
have been resolved on an equal protection basis using only the facts and precedent in exist-
ence at the time of the original opinion, see Ruthann Robson, United States v. Windsor, in 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS 306–16, 312 (Bridget J. Crawford & An-
thony C. Infanti eds., 2017) (rewriting decision of the Supreme Court to provide that “equal 
protection challenges on the basis of sexual orientation classifications deserve intermediate 
scrutiny, similar to the gender and sex classifications that sexual orientation classifications 
resemble and upon which they rely,” and explaining applicable precedent that leads to that 
result). 
 257. See, e.g., Introduction, in CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, at xxi (Anthony 
C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2009) (describing as among the goals of critical tax 
scholarship the desire “to explore and expose how the tax laws both reflect and construct 
social meaning”); see also ANDRE L. SMITH, TAX LAW AND RACIAL ECONOMIC JUSTICE: BLACK 
TAX 3 (2015) (explaining the role of critical tax theory in “exposing when and where neu-
trally worded tax laws create, maintain or exacerbate disparate economic impacts relating 
to race”); Bridget Crawford (@ProfBCrawford), TWITTER (June 26, 2018, 1:05 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/ProfBCrawford/status/1011702004006219779 [https://perma.cc/9LU2-LFHW] 
(“#CriticalTax theorists try to point out that #tax law reflects and constitutes the society 
that produces it. The tax system is deeply implicated in discrimination based on race, gen-
der, disability, immigration status.”). 
 258. See, e.g., Kaeding, supra note 208 (“An ideal sales tax should apply to all final con-
sumer purchases, without regard to whether items are classified as ‘necessities’ or ‘luxu-
ries.’’’). A tax system that makes no distinction between taxable and nontaxable sales is 
nondistortive. Id. (explaining that tax system with a broad base “does not favor one type of 
consumption over another, meaning that a consumer does not have to choose between one 
item that is taxed versus another item that isn’t taxed”). If the law does not make judgments 
about what items are “necessities,” and thus exempt from sales tax, then taxation will play 
no role in a purchaser’s choice to consume one product over another, all other factors being 
equal. See id. Also, if all states had a broad sales tax base with no exemptions, there would 
be a reduction of distortion caused by purchasers who are willing to travel to a nontax ju-
risdiction in order to avoid their home state’s sales tax. See, e.g., Michael Smart, Lessons in 
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the sales tax. But that fiscal interest alone should not be enough 
to satisfy rational basis review, just as the United States’ interest 
in collecting $363,500 in federal estate taxes from Edith Windsor 
was insufficient.259 The rationality of the basis for collecting that 
money matters, too. And given that the thirty-five states with the 
tampon tax already exempt other items as necessities, the refusal 
to include menstrual hygiene products on that list is irrational.260 
There is no serious dispute about whether menstrual hygiene prod-
ucts are necessities. When a state imposes a tax on a product that 
a woman needs solely because she is a woman, the state is, in ef-
fect, taxing her for being female. 
Because the tampon tax is highly salient and the discriminatory 
impact is one that consumers can easily quantify,261 repealing the 
 
Harmony: What Experience in the Atlantic Provinces Shows About the Harmonized Sales 
Tax, 253 C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENT. 1, 5 (2007) (describing distortion that occurs when 
adjacent jurisdictions have different tax bases or rates and consumers engage in strategic 
behavior to minimize incidence of taxation). This “forum shopping” applies only if the home 
jurisdiction lacks a use tax or if the taxpayer fails to comply with reporting and payment 
obligations under the use tax system and the non-compliance remains undetected.  
On the difference between a sales use tax and a consumer’s obligation to report and pay 
tax on items purchased outside the domiciliary jurisdiction, see, for example, M. Patrick 
Wilson & Christopher Price, Local Government Sales and Use Taxes, 40 COLO. LAW. 61–62 
& nn.8–14 (2011) (describing Colorado’s complex sales and use tax system); Thimmesch, 
supra note 33 (explaining that use taxes are typically involved in state taxation of online 
sales). There would remain an incentive to travel in order to take advantage of any differ-
ences in sales tax rates, if states continued to tax at different rates, but presumably this 
behavior would be less frequent than in a regime in which there are both different rates and 
jurisdictions that retain sales tax exemptions. Given that five states have no income tax at 
all, it is unlikely that even a unified rate combined with a tax base without sales tax exemp-
tions would completely eliminate strategic behavior. See, e.g., id. A move to a sales tax base 
with zero exemptions is politically unlikely, however. See, e.g., Kaeding, supra note 208 (ex-
plaining that “this idea of exempting necessities is a political one, not an economic one”).  
 259. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 753. After the Obama administration announced that it would 
not defend the constitutionality of DOMA,  the  Bipartisan  Law  Advisory  Group (“BLAG”) 
intervened  in  the case.  Id.  at  754; see  also  Jennifer  Bendery,  Defense  of  Marriage  Act: 
House  Republicans  Tie  Federal  Gay  Marriage  Ban  to  House  Rules,  HUFFPOST  (Jan. 
2, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/defense-of-marriage-act_n_2399383.html 
[https://perma.cc/FNN9-DT4F] (describing House Republican Conference decision to pay 
outside counsel to represent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group in defending DOMA). 
Note that in its attempt to defend DOMA, BLAG argued that DOMA was substantially re-
lated to the important government interest of protecting the fisc. See Windsor v. United 
States, 699 F.3d 169, 176, 185 (2d Cir. 2012). The Second Circuit rejected that argument, 
stating that DOMA was not substantially related to fiscal matters, and even if it were, “the 
Supreme Court has held that ‘the saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invid-
ious classification.’” Id. at 186. As the district court [in Windsor] observed, “excluding any 
arbitrarily chosen group of individuals from a government program conserves government 
resources.” Windsor, 699 F.3d at 186–87 (quoting Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 
394, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).  
 260. See supra Part I.B. 
 261. See Crawford & Spivack, supra note 43, at 546 (“Another reason that the movement 
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tax would provide immediate financial relief to women and have a 
powerful signaling effect.262 Exempting menstrual hygiene prod-
ucts from sales taxation communicates that women are valued and 
necessary participants in all aspects of public life, and that they 
should no longer suffer a tax penalty on account of their biology.263 
To use Justice Ginsburg’s words, the exemption furthers the “full 
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people.”264 
By contrast, the continued imposition of the sales tax on menstrual 
hygiene products, while other products are exempted as necessi-
ties, exacerbates the aggregate economic inequality that already 
exists between the sexes.265 Maintaining that sales tax maintains 
inequality. 
CONCLUSION 
Some critics have suggested that the tampon tax issue is too 
small to merit significant attention.266 We disagree. First, while a 
 
to repeal the tampon tax has garnered so much support is that the issue is both concrete 
and easy to understand. Women know how much they pay per month for menstrual hygiene 
products and are outraged when they find out that similar products used primarily by men 
are not subject to taxation. Thus, the issue of gender discrimination is reduced to dollars 
and cents. The consequences are felt each month by every menstruating woman.”).  
 262. See generally Tsilly Dagan, The Currency of Taxation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 
(2016) (describing ways that tax system communicates social and other values). 
 263. The same signaling effect occurs when a workplace, school, or other facility provides 
no-cost menstrual hygiene products. See, e.g., Elizabeth Plank, If Men Had Their Period, 
Would Tampons in Your Office Be Free?, MIC (Apr. 4, 2014), https://mic.com/articles/86 
819/if-men-had-their-period-would-tampons-in-your-office-be-free  [https://perma.cc/92GQ-
VPKN] (quoting one marketing director about her corporation’s decision to provide free men-
strual hygiene products in office bathrooms as saying, “A third of our staff is women, and 
it’s something subtle that shows we’re a woman-friendly environment. It’s not unlike some 
of the other employee perks we offer from cookies on your birthday to pizza and beer 
nights.”). Yet while there is unanimous cultural consensus that these locations should pro-
vide toilet paper to employees, students, and guests, the same is not true with respect to 
menstrual hygiene products. See Representative Sean Patrick Maloney, (@RepSeanMalon 
ey), TWITTER (June 18, 2018, 11:55 AM), https://twitter.com/RepSeanMaloney/status/101 
2409246112198656 [https://perma.cc/CVA6-5K3M] (“My office bought tampons for female 
visitors and our staff. Then we got an email from @HouseAdmnGOP telling us we couldn’t 
use funds to purchase a necessary hygiene product. That’s ridiculous.”).  
 264. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996).  
 265. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament: Reinventing Antidiscrim-
ination Law in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425, 430 (2018) (describing historical 
patterns of economic inequality between men and women); Michele E. Gilman, En-Gender-
ing Economic Inequality, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 9 (2016) (identifying major trends in 
gender and economic inequality in the twenty-first century including women’s declining em-
ployment rate, women’s lower pay for equal work, and greater rates of poverty among 
women).  
 266. See, e.g., Miranda Stewart (@AusTaxProf), TWITTER (June 18, 2018, 4:00 PM), https: 
//twitter.com/AusTaxProf/status/1008846954158219264 [https://perma.cc/LXU9-ZA7W] 
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particular sales tax may seem small to a person with a steady job 
that pays a living wage (or more), it can represent a significant 
percentage of a jobless or homeless woman’s available assets.267 
Second, and relatedly, even if the tampon tax’s impact on each in-
dividual woman is small, the aggregate numbers are substantial. 
California alone recently estimated that it was collecting $20 mil-
lion in annual sales tax revenue from the tampon tax.268 News out-
lets estimated that prior to the November 2018 ballot initiative in 
Nevada,269 the state collected between $4.96 million and $7.11 mil-
lion annually on the sales of menstrual hygiene products.270 Those 
moneys collectively represent a significant equal protection viola-
tion—one occurring in the majority of other states as well. 
If one is committed as a matter of principle to non-discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender, then the magnitude of the discrimina-
tion is not a solid theoretical basis on which to determine whether 
the discrimination should be tolerated. Recall that the Supreme 
Court first reached agreement that sex-based classifications 
should trigger intermediate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren, where Ok-
lahoma was prohibiting males from buying nonintoxicating 3.2% 
beer until they were twenty-one, even though females could do so 
at age eighteen.271 Arguably, that disparity did not reflect a press-
ing public policy concern—but imagine how different current law 
might be had it not been challenged. Similarly, what if a female 
high school student had never challenged her rejection from the 
 
(“#Feminists should fight for a strong #income #tax system and broad based #GST to fund 
public services—including #childcare. Exempting #tampons from #GST looks like a win for 
women but is distracting and tiny compared to what we need for #gender equality[.]”). 
 267. See, e.g., Dasha Burns, Should Tampons Be Tax Free?, CNN (Mar. 4, 2016), https:// 
www.cnn.com/2016/03/04/opinions/tampon-tax-burns/index.html [https://perma.cc/4RHE-
YJMF] (“For low-income women, access to these ‘luxury’ goods can be a real challenge, es-
pecially since food stamps don’t cover feminine hygiene products.”); see also Christopher 
Cotropia & Kyle Rozema, Who Benefits from Repealing Tampon Taxes? Empirical Evidence 
from New Jersey, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 620, 639 (2018) (finding in one jurisdiction 
that repealed its tax on menstrual hygiene products, the greatest beneficiaries were low-
income consumers). 
 268. See Kaeding, supra note 208. 
 269. See supra note 67. 
 270. See Jana Kasperkevic, Nevada’s “Tampon Tax” Ballot Initiative Brings Up Ques-
tions About Gender Equality, MARKETPLACE (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/ 
2018/11/01/elections/nevada-s-tampon-tax-ballot-initiative-brings-questions-about-fairness 
-and [https://perma.cc/5YTS-QSXU] (using offical state estimates of 867,000 girls and 
women in Nevada between the ages of twelve and fifty-five, and estimating a monthly ex-
pense of $7 to $10 per month per person, for a total of $6.1 million to $8.7 million in sanitary 
napkins and pads each month; given a tax rate of 6.85 per cent, such expenditures would 
generate between $4.96 million and $7.11 million in annual state sales tax revenue). 
 271. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).  
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Virginia Military Institute?272 Even today, only eleven percent of 
VMI’s students are women, but the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Virginia has had much broader implications.273 
History suggests that reducing discrimination requires multiple 
challenges over a long period of time.274 In other words, efforts to 
repeal the tampon tax should be understood as part of a larger 
strategy in reducing or eliminating discrimination on the basis of 
gender.275 Whether treating people differently for tax purposes 
gives rise to a tax bill of more than $300,000 (as in Windsor)276 or 
$300 (as one might pay in taxation for a lifetime supply of men-
strual hygiene products),277 the disparity is unfair and violates the 
Equal Protection Clause. The tampon tax is unconstitutional and 
should be repealed in all states. 
 
 272. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 523 (1996). 
 273. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements 
on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) (describing 
the Rehnquist Court, over the objections of Chief Justice Rehnquist, as “just as vigorous as 
the Burger Court was in carrying out the liberal feminist politics of recognition under cover 
of the Equal Protection Clause”); Yoshino, supra note 196, at 756 n.61 (describing the inter-
mediate scrutiny as articulated in United States v. Virginia as “quite close to strict scru-
tiny”); see also Abigail L. Perdue, Transforming “Shedets” into “Keydets”: An Empirical 
Study Examining Coeducation Through the Lens of Gender Polarization, 28 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 371, 372 (2014) (describing entrenchment of gender roles as one result of co-
education at Virginia Military Institute, based on a survey of 364 VMI students); Michael 
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